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INTRODUCTION 
The patent grant is a social contract.1  Society defers for a 
limited time the right to make, use, or sell2 an invention that 
is useful, novel, and nonobvious.3  In exchange, the applicant 
provides a disclosure that teaches one of ordinary skill in the 
art how best to make and use that invention.4  As a result, 
society trades a period of exclusivity for a defined contribu-
tion to its body of useful knowledge.5  As more commonly 
 
1. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) (stating that a 
patent is a public bargain of exclusive use in return for disclosure”); see also Mark 
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 
1276 n.166 (1995) (“Patent law has been described as a social contract in which 
the interests of all parties must be balanced.”); Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New 
Kind of Intellectual Property:  Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Pro-
grams, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 511 n.195 (1985) (“It is common to see copyright and 
patent law described as a kind of social contract or bargain.”); Jeff Kuehnle, Hil-
ton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.:  Opening the Floodgates on Non-
literal Patent Infringement Through the Doctrine of Equivalents, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 
589, 604 (1996) (“Patent law was created as a contract between society and an in-
ventor . . . .”). 
2. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1996) (“[W]hoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of 
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870) 
(discussing the exclusive right granted to the inventor); Christopher S. Marchese, 
Promoting the Progress of the Useful Arts by Narrowing Best Mode Disclosure Re-
quirements in Patent Law, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 594-95 (1993) (“Inventors who 
apply for patent protection and whose works qualify under the current act will 
obtain the exclusive right and liberty to make, use and sell their inventions 
. . . .”).  For a discussion of the three conditions of patentability see infra notes 18-
25 and accompanying text. 
4. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) 
(“The applicant . . . who is willing to reveal to the public the substance of his dis-
covery and ‘the best mode . . . of carrying out his invention,’ is granted ‘the right 
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States.’”) (citations omitted); Thomas L. Irving et al., The Significant Fed-
eral Circuit Cases Interpreting Section 112, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 621, 623 (1992) (“Dis-
closure by the inventor . . . is the consideration in the social contract between the 
inventor and the government.”). 
5. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186, modified, 
289 U.S. 706 (1933) (explaining that granting a patent to an inventor “gives some-
thing of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge”) 
(citation omitted); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 
(1996) (stating that the government grants inventors “‘the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented inven-
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stated, disclosure is the quid pro quo for the patent grant..6 
Inventors rightfully seek a scope of protection consistent 
with their inventive contribution to the art.7  That is, the 
scope of protection afforded depends upon the invention.  
For example, a pioneering invention is entitled to a broad 
scope of protection, while an incremental improvement war-
rants a more narrow scope.8  Inventors working in the un-
predictable arts experience peculiar problems specifying the 
breadth of the inventive contribution, and thus defining the 
proper scope of protection.9 
                                                                                                                                  
tion,’ in exchange for full disclosure of an invention”) (quoting 1 H. SCHWARTZ, 
PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 33 (2d ed. 1995)); see also Keuhnle, supra note 1, at 604 
(stating that the purpose of a patent is “to ensure that the inventor receives a lim-
ited monopoly on the invention in consideration for disclosing it to the public”). 
As the Supreme Court explained in Kewanee Oil Co.: 
When a patent is granted and the information in it is circulated to the 
general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions 
to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public 
weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 
years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, 
will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant 
advances in the art. 
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 481.  The GATT Implementing Legislation has 
changed the term of a patent such that a patent granted on an application filed 
on or after June 8, 1995 commences on the date of grant and expires 20 years 
from the application filing date, or the date from which priority is claimed.  See 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 531-533, 108 Stat. 4809, 
4882-90 (1994). 
6. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS:  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENT-
ABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 7.01 (1996) (“The requirement of adequate 
disclosure assures that the public receives ‘quid pro quo’ for the limited mo-
nopoly granted to the inventor.”); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) 
(“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for 
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an inven-
tion with substantial utility.”). 
7. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LAW, WHAT IS A PATENT? 1 (1981). 
8. Cf. Stephen G. Whiteside, Patents Claiming Genetically Engineered Inven-
tions:  A Few Thoughts on Obtaining Broad Property Rights, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1019, 1034 (1996) (“[I]nventions that represent dramatic technological advance-
ments are given a greater range of equivalents than those that represent modifi-
cation of existing inventions.”). 
9. See Mark D. Schuman, Patent Protection for Microbiological Processes:  Has 
In re Argoudelis Been Mutated?, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1679, 1701 (1984) (concluding 
that as unpredictability in an art increases, the scope of protection afforded in-
    
1996] FALSE INVENTIVE GENUS 151 
The unpredictable arts are those technological disciplines 
for which there is insufficient learning to explain, a priori, 
the effect that changed variables will have within a system.10  
Unpredictable arts might be newly emerging areas of scien-
tific inquiry and discovery, or disciplines long recognized as 
defying generalization within the confines of established sci-
entific principles.11 
 Some disciplines might not suffer from the “unpredict-
able” label indefinitely.  An emerging technology might be 
deemed unpredictable only temporarily—as the emerging 
technology is applied, it matures and its unpredictability 
fades.12  As a result, the task of describing the incremental 
innovations of a maturing technology increasingly becomes 
definite and routine. 
Other disciplines are perceived to be more persistently 
                                                                                                                                  
ventions in that art should decrease); see also Garth Butterfield et al., Biotechnology 
Protection and Licensing, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING & LITIGATION, at 235, 250 (PLI 
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 386, 1996). 
10. One commentator has made an analogous argument concerning chemi-
cal inventions: 
Special concerns arise with chemical patents because the properties of 
chemical compounds can be less predictable than those of mechanical 
inventions.  When an inventor brings together old mechanical compo-
nents, normally no new and unexpected result follows.  In contrast, a 
slight change in the structure or composition of a chemical compound 
can have dramatic effects on its properties. 
Julie A. Hokans, In re Bard:  A New Approach to Obviousness of Chemical Com-
pounds, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197, 205 (1995) (citations omitted). 
11. Compare Ex parte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (Pat. Bd. App. & Int. 
1985 1985) (classifying as unpredictable the then emerging use of hybridoma 
technology to create monoclonal antibodies) with In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786 
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (discussing pharmacology as a discipline persistently deemed 
unpredictable). 
12. See Butterfield et al., supra note 8, at 243, 247; Allan G. Altera, Expanding 
the Reissue Procedure:  A Better Way To Do Business, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 209 
(1993).  One example of an emerging technology once branded as unpredictable, 
but now routinely applied is the use of biotechnology, particularly hybridoma 
technology, to create monoclonal antibodies.  See Edward T. Lentz, Adequacy of 
Disclosures of Biotechnology Inventions, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 314, 322 (1989) (acknowledg-
ing that the preparation of monoclonal antibodies is achievable by standard 
techniques, and discussing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
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unpredictable.13  Contributing to the perception of unpre-
dictability is often a real or imagined interplay of a host of 
unknowns and variables.  As a result, it might be difficult to 
accurately describe the breadth of a particular contribution 
to the relevant art. 
Within the law of patents, the unpredictable arts bring to 
the fore the issue of the sufficiency of a patent applicant’s 
disclosure.14  The issue arises when an applicant describes 
and claims an invention broadly amidst a paucity of sup-
porting data or examples.15  When the applicant has relied 
upon unsupported inferences or reasoning by extrapolation 
to generalize the invention, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) will likely reject the applicant’s 
claim for insufficiency of disclosure.16 
 
13. One discipline persistently perceived as “unpredictable” is pharmacol-
ogy and the study of the effects of biologically active agents on the body.  See, 
e.g., In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (involving a patent claim of a dis-
covery that certain already existing pharmaceutical compounds have an anti-
depressant effect when administered internally).  Minor molecular modifications 
in an active agent might cause profoundly different effects when administered to 
a living organism.  See, e.g., id.; cf. John C. Todaro, Enablement in Biotechnology 
Cases After In re Goodman, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 37 
(1994) (stating that the highly competitive nature of the biotechnology industry 
often prompts patent applicants in that field to seek claims that are undeniably 
broad). 
14. The literature contains no systematic analysis of insufficiency of disclo-
sure rejections as they are applied in the unpredictable arts.  Although one com-
mentator thoroughly catalogs the PTO’s various bases for rejection based upon 
insufficiency of disclosure, the discussion is directed more generally to the PTO’s 
sufficiency of disclosure challenges, and the corresponding burdens of proof, 
without particular emphasis on the unpredictable arts or an analysis of the root 
causes for those rejections.  See Edward C. Walterscheid, Insufficient Disclosure 
Rejections (pts. 1-6), 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y  217, 229, 261, 361, 387, 546 (1980). 
Another commentator looks at the unique problems associated with meeting 
the enablement requirement in rapidly developing arts, particularly biotechnol-
ogy.  See generally Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts—
Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 608 (1988).  Ms. Winner does not, however, 
emphasize the underlying causes of those rejections.  See generally id. 
15. See Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Pat-
ents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 455 (1994) (“In the competitive biotechnology indus-
try, companies often seek broad claims to protect contemplated embodiments of 
their inventions that have not yet been reduced to practice.”). 
16. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming the PTO’s 
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The inventor’s generalized description might be im-
proper when the applicant has broadly defined the inven-
tion, based upon arbitrarily selected features common 
among the supporting examples, but not necessarily coinci-
dent with the inventive feature or result—that is, where the 
applicant defines the invention based upon superficial 
commonalities or reasoning by extrapolation from few ex-
amples.17  This Article proposes that such undue generaliza-
tion can result in the creation of a false inventive genus, and 
that the identification of such generalization will bring 
greater consistency to rejections for insufficient disclosure. 
While courts and the PTO have rejected patent claims on 
grounds that incorporate the principles of the false inventive 
genus, the rejections are often poorly articulated as the phe-
nomenon of the false inventive genus has not been previ-
ously identified as such.  Part I introduces the policy and 
statutory requirements of patent disclosure, and explains the 
complications of disclosure in the unpredictable arts.  Part II 
examines the evolution and present status of the sufficiency 
of disclosure inquiry.  Part III argues that current case law, 
which is seemingly discordant for evaluating the sufficiency 
                                                                                                                                  
rejection, based on an applicant’s failure to satisfy the enablement requirement 
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for all but the narrowest claims in a patent application for a 
genetically engineered vaccine to protect against retroviruses).  Such extrapola-
tion or generalization leads to consideration of the “genus-species” relationship.  
See CHISUM, supra note 6, § 12.03[3], at 12-67 (addressing genus-species relation-
ship in the context of restriction requirements).  The phrase has a rather special-
ized use within the field of patent law.  For example, genus claims are broader 
claims that embrace a variety of potential embodiments of the invention.  Id.  On 
the other hand, species claims are narrower, and are usually limited to a single 
embodiment or a single option for a particular variable.  Id.  As a result, the PTO 
might make rejections of genus claims on the grounds that such claims are sup-
ported by an insufficient number of species of examples.  See U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.02 (6th ed. 
rev. 1 1995) [hereinafter M.P.E.P.] (“The lack of a working example, however, is a 
factor to be considered, especially in a case involving an unpredictable and un-
derdeveloped art.”).  The terms are necessarily relative, thereby prompting a de-
gree of ambiguity.  CHISUM, supra note 6, § 12.03[3][b], at 12-69. 
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining that some biotech-
nology companies define a patent broadly to protect yet-to-be discovered em-
bodiments). 
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of disclosure for the unpredictable arts, can be reconciled 
under a new approach—the false inventive genus.  Accord-
ingly, this Article concludes that courts and the PTO should 
more particularly identify instances of suspected reliance on 
a false inventive genus.  Challenges to the patentability or 
validity of a claim on such a basis will focus attention more 
effectively on the perceived shortcoming, thereby narrowing 
the issues and facilitating their proper resolution. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 
The three pillars of patentability are Utility, Invention, 
and Disclosure.18  Utility and Invention are requirements di-
rected to the invention itself—the subject matter for which 
the applicant seeks an exclusive right; disclosure, on the 
other hand, is more a formal requirement directed to the 
content of the application.19 
Congress implemented these requirements through the 
Patent Act of 1952 (“Patent Act”),20 which states that a pat-
entable invention:  (1) must have some demonstrable practi-
cal use;21 (2) must be new;22 and (3) must be more than a 
 
18. One commentator refers to the three white horses of patentability:  “[a]n 
applicant for a patent must come riding on ‘three white horses’; he must present 
a clear disclosure of his invention, his invention must transcend the skill of the 
art and it must be useful.”  S. Wolffe, Adequacy of Disclosure as Regards Specific 
Embodiment and Use of Invention, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 61, 61 (1959).  Conceptualiz-
ing these requirements as pillars reinforces that they are requisite structural ele-
ments, without which the application for patent cannot stand.  
19. See Bradford J. Duft, Patent Infringement and Biotechnology, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 
339, 352 (1989) (“The invention as defined by the claims and the description of 
the physical embodiment of the invention are two quite different things.”); see 
also 3 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 9:1, at 11 
(3d ed. 1985) (“It should be borne in mind that patents are creatures of stat-
ute . . . and that patent specifications, drawings, and claims must be drafted to 
conform and be in harmony with the statutory and Patent Office requirements.”). 
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994). 
21. Patentable subject matter is defined as “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof.”  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
22. The Patent Act’s novelty requirement precludes patentability of inven-
tions that have been invented by others, or that have been publicly disclosed or 
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mere obvious alteration or improvement over what was pre-
viously known in the relevant art.23  The Patent Act also de-
fines the disclosure requirement.24  This requirement does 
not address the merits of the invention.  Rather, the disclo-
sure requirement states what the applicant must tender in 
exchange for the patent grant.  Disclosure is a contrivance 
separate from the invention; but like the invention, it can be 
dispositive of the application, or of the validity or enforce-
ability of the patent.25 
This part introduces the disclosure requirement and de-
scribes its application to the unpredictable arts.  First, this 
part explains the policies underlying the disclosure require-
ment.  Second, this part discusses the statutory requirements 
of patent disclosure.  Third, this part addresses the complica-
tions of disclosure in the unpredictable arts.  Finally, this 
part analyzes the application of the disclosure requirement 
to the unpredictable arts. 
A. The Policies of Disclosure 
The policies underlying the disclosure requirement are 
born of the constitutional mandate that Congress provide a 
framework for granting copyrights and patents.26  In a rare 
instance in which the Founding Fathers coupled an enumer-
ated power with a specific objective, the Constitution em-
powers Congress “to promote Progress of . . . useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Discoveries.”27  True to the constitutional 
mandate, the promotion of the useful arts has been the objec-
                                                                                                                                  
sold more than one year prior to the filing date of the application.  35 U.S.C. § 
102. 
23. The Patent Act’s nonobviousness requirement demands that the subject 
of the grant be an inventive contribution to the art; that is, something that would 
not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention 
was made.  35 U.S.C. § 103. 
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.    
25. See, e.g., LIPSCOMB, supra note 19, § 10:17, at 234. 
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
27. Id. 
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tive of the various patent statutes and the body of law inter-
preting them.28 
The Founding Fathers thought it equitable to reward in-
ventors with the grant of a limited exclusive right.29  They 
acknowledged society’s interests by specifying that the grant 
of such rights be structured to promote the progress of the 
“useful arts.”30  In exchange for this exclusive right, Con-
gress, beginning with the Patent Act of 1790,31 has continu-
ally insisted upon full and fair disclosure of both the inven-
tion and the exclusive right claimed by the innovator.32  
Congress has thus implemented a patent system that bal-
ances the private interests of the inventor with the public 
benefits of disclosure.33 
By requiring applicants to identify the invention for 
which they seek an exclusive right,34 Congress seeks to pro-
tect the private interests of innovators by allowing them to 
give notice of the exclusive right, and “inform the public 
during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly as-
serted.”35 
Just as inventors benefit from a public disclosure of their 
 
28. See generally, CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.01-.03; LIPSCOMB, supra note 19, § 
1:8-:9. 
29. See Canady, supra note 15, at 456 (“To encourage the development of 
technology, the federal government grants patent protection to those who invent 
products or processes in exchange for public disclosure of their inventions.”). 
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).  According to Mr. Madison: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.  The copy right of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at 
common law.  The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason 
to belong to the inventors.  The public good fully coincides in both 
cases, with the claims of individuals. 
Id. 
31. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
32. See CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.02. 
33. See, e.g., Matheson v. Campbell, 69 F. 597, 604 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895) (“The 
consideration received from the disclosure of the discovery to the public is the 
foundation of the right to the monopoly of the patent.”), reh’g granted, 77 F. 280, 
281 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896), rev’d on other grounds, 78 F. 910 (2d Cir. 1897). 
34. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
35. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931). 
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exclusive right, so too does the public.  First, disclosure 
teaches those in the relevant art how to make and use the in-
vention, thereby enabling the public to exploit the invention 
at the end of the patent term.36  Second, the disclosure re-
quirement assures an immediate contribution to the art, so 
that others might make improvements and advances during 
the term of the patent.37  Finally, disclosure protects the pub-
lic against undue, ad hoc extension of the exclusive right.38 
Consequently, through the disclosure requirement (in-
cluding the presentation of particularized claims),39 Con-
gress assures that the public will receive quid pro quo for the 
patent grant; that is, society gains a detailed enabling disclo-
sure, as well as fair notice of the scope of the exclusive right, 
and protection against undue extension of that right.40 
 
36. See, e.g., id. (stating that the patentee must describe the invention in 
enough detail so that any person skilled in the art may construct and use it after 
the patent expires). 
37. See Paul M. Janicke, Patent Disclosure:  Some Problems and Current Devel-
opments, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 3 (1971); see also In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 
1960), overruled on other grounds by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 943-46 (C.C.P.A. 1967) 
(discussing the level of usefulness required to be considered a contribution to the 
art).  In Nelson, the court harkened back to historical texts, including PHILLIPS, 
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS (1837): 
There are two objects in view in making a specification.  As the law 
grants the patentee a monopoly, and not only awards damages, but in-
flicts a penalty for violation of the exclusive privilege, it very equitably 
requires that the invention shall be so described in the specification, that 
every person may, by examining it, know what the patentee claims, and be 
able to distinguish what may be an infringement.  The other object of 
the specification is to give the public the advantage of the invention after the 
expiration of the patent. . . . [W]e add to Phillips’ explanation that a fur-
ther public advantage from the specification is the addition it makes to 
technical literature immediately upon issuance of the patent, without 
waiting for its expiration. 
280 F.2d at 181 (emphasis added). 
38. See, e.g., Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 
484-85 (1944) (“The claim is the measure of the grant . . . [and] is required to be 
specific for the very purpose of protecting the public against extension of the 
scope of the patent.”) (citation omitted). 
39. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (explaining “particularized 
claims”). 
40. See, e.g., Universal Oil, 322 U.S. at 484.  The Supreme Court explained: 
As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the 
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B. Statutory Requirements of Disclosure 
To fulfill the foregoing objectives of the patent system, 
Congress devised section 112 of the Patent Act (“section 
112”).41  Paragraph one of section 112 very explicitly states 
the requirements of disclosure:  that the application contain 
a written description of the invention sufficient to enable an 
artisan, skilled in the relevant art, to make and use the inven-
tion, and that it set forth the inventor’s best mode42 of put-
ting the invention into practice.43 
Compliance with the above is often analyzed from the 
perspective of three independent requirements:  (1) written 
description; (2) enablement; and (3) best mode.44  Satisfac-
tion of the first requirement, a written description, would 
seem a rather plain and innocuous task.  Nonetheless, the 
                                                                                                                                  
United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who re-
frains from keeping his invention a trade secret.  But the quid pro quo is 
disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled 
in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has 
expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to 
warn the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly as-
serted. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The 
basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for grant-
ing a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention 
with substantial utility.”). 
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
42. Id.  “Best mode” refers to the patent applicant’s requirement to disclose 
“the best mode of practicing an invention [which] refers to the component parts 
or ingredients or parameters that an inventor considers to work particularly well 
with the invention.”  Roy E. Hofer & L. Ann Fitzgerald, New Rules for Old Prob-
lems:  Defining Contours of the Best Mode Requirement in Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 2309, 2349 n.1 (1995). 
43. The first paragraph of section 112 states the disclosure requirements 
which the application, also referred to as “the specification,” must fulfill: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the inven-
tion, and the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth 
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (emphasis added). 
44. Id. 
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written description is an independent, and sometimes fate-
ful, requirement within the unpredictable arts.45  Indeed, it 
has been urged that treating the call for a written description 
as an independent requirement, rather than as a mere modi-
fier, is anomalous, and if appropriate at all, only so in com-
plex chemical cases.46 
The second requirement, enablement, is the most preg-
nant with ambiguity,47 and is the birthplace of this Article.  
Intertwined with satisfaction of the enablement requirement 
is the obligation to teach one of skill in the art how-to-make 
and how-to-use the invention.  This, too, would seem a plain 
and innocuous task, but for the complexity of the unpredict-
able arts.48 
The third, and final, requirement of disclosure, best 
mode, simply obligates the applicant to disclose the inven-
tion fully, including the relevant tricks of the trade as it 
were, so as not to conceal within the one hand, what is seem-
ingly revealed in the other.49  If the inventor knows of spe-
 
45. M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2161 (“The written description requirement is 
separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.”) (citations omitted); see 
also In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[I]t is possible for a speci-
fication to enable the practice of an invention as broadly as it is claimed, and still 
not describe that invention.”); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
46. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To 
the uninitiated, it may seem anomalous that the first paragraph of [section 112] 
has been interpreted as requiring a separate ‘description of the invention,’ when 
the invention is, necessarily, the subject matter defined in the claims under con-
sideration.”); see also In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 594 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Markey, C. J., 
dissenting) (stating that it is “incongruous,” and “exaltive of form over sub-
stance” to conclude that the disclosure of an invention in such “clear, concise and 
exact terms as to enable its practice” somehow fails to meet a distinct written de-
scription requirement), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). 
47. Cf. Canady, supra note 15, at 458 (“Biotechnology companies often en-
counter frustration when trying to satisfy the enablement requirement.”) (citation 
omitted). 
48. See Lentz, supra note 12, at 315-16 (acknowledging that the enablement 
requirement presents special problems for patents disclosing and claiming bio-
technology inventions); see also Canady, supra note 15, at 458 (explaining that sat-
isfaction of the enablement requirement is much more challenging with chemical 
and biological inventions than with mechanical innovations). 
49. See, e.g., In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“Manifestly, the sole 
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cific techniques, instrumentalities, or characteristics (referred 
to as preferred embodiments) for best putting the invention 
into practice, the best mode requirement mandates disclo-
sure of that information to the public.50 
The second paragraph of section 112 states that the speci-
fication shall conclude with one or more claims “particularly 
point[ing] out and distinctly claim[ing]” the subject matter 
which the applicant regards as his invention.51  Claims are 
single sentence descriptions that specify the measure, or es-
tablish the metes and bounds, of the exclusive right.52  In so 
doing, the claims define the outer limits of the exclusive 
right asserted, thereby putting the public on notice so as to 
avoid infringement.53  Similarly, the claims commit the pat-
entee to a particular scope of protection, thus preventing 
improper ad hoc extension of the exclusive right.54 
                                                                                                                                  
purpose of this latter requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for pat-
ents while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of 
their inventions which they have in fact conceived.”). 
50. Marchese, supra note 2, at 599; see also Gay, 309 F.2d at 772.  Because best 
mode rejections are not peculiar to the unpredictable arts, this Article does not 
discuss them further.  See Lentz, supra note 12, at 315 (“The requirement to set 
forth the best mode of an invention seems no more often or greater a problem in 
cases of biotechnology inventions than in typical chemical cases.”); see also 
Whiteside, supra note 7, at 1028 (“One particularly difficult issue presented by 
biotechnological inventions has been the satisfaction of the enablement require-
ment.”). 
51. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
52. See generally CHISUM, supra note 6, §§ 8.02, 8.06.  According to one 
commentator: 
The only known (or at least acceptable) way so far to particularly point 
out and distinctly claim an invention in a statutory class is by means of 
an English sentence.  This is unfortunate, because many of the problems 
in claim drafting stem from problems in writing English and in the 
meanings of words. 
JOHN L. LANDIS, MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 7 (2d ed. 1974). 
53. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 8.03. 
54. Id. § 8.03[1]; see also id. § 8.03 (“On occasion, courts, including the Su-
preme Court, have failed to distinguish carefully the requirement of definiteness, 
which claims must meet, from the requirement of enablement, which the disclo-
sure of the specification must meet.”).  Except insofar as the obligation to claim 
the invention is confused with the obligation to disclose the invention, claims are 
not addressed further in this Article. 
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C. Application of the Disclosure Requirement to the  
 Unpredictable Arts 
As noted above, compliance with the disclosure require-
ment can be dispositive of the application, regardless of the 
merits of the invention.55  The disclosure, however, can only 
negatively affect patentability; that is, where the specifica-
tion fails to meet the requirements of section 112.  This sec-
tion explains the application of the disclosure requirement to 
the unpredictable arts.  This section first introduces the 
commonly acknowledged complications of disclosure in the 
unpredictable arts.  This section then examines how the 
courts and the PTO address those complications, and how 
their treatment might affect the scope of protection an appli-
cant is ultimately granted. 
1. The Complications of Disclosure in the  
 Unpredictable Arts 
a. Terminology and Language 
Describing even the simplest of inventions is often a chal-
lenge—even more so with inventions that are either unpre-
dictable or perceived as such.56  After all, inventions are, by 
definition, new and non-obvious.57  As a result, they often do 
not fit neatly within established theories or paradigms.  This 
amorphism can frustrate attempts to comply with the Patent 
Act’s mandate that disclosure be in full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms.58  For example, in Autogiro Co. of America v. 
 
55. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see LIPSCOMB, supra note 19, § 
9:1. 
56. See, e.g., Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indust., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 
1117 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“‘The specification and claims of a patent . . . constitute one 
of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy.’”) (citation omit-
ted). 
57. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103. 
58. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 12, at 315 (“The written description require-
ment is sometimes more problematic [in biotechnology,] owing to the common 
use in patent claims of words and phrases that may be jargon or otherwise not 
widely understood, or that may be subjective or functional.”). 
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United States,59 the United States Court of Claims60 acknowl-
edged the inherent difficulties of the disclosure requirement.  
The Autogiro court observed that the process of discovery 
necessarily precedes description of that discovery, and that 
language, terminology, and nomenclature necessarily lag in-
vention.61  For this reason, the Court of Claims would grant 
an applicant latitude in creating and defining the terminol-
ogy of the invention.62 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”) 
also acknowledged the occasional incompatibility of lan-
guage and innovation.63  In so doing, the C.C.P.A. refused to 
 
59. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
60. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which came 
into being in 1982, assumed the responsibilities of the United States Court of 
Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”).  
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 16, 18, 19, 25, 26, 28, 35 & 41 U.S.C.) (1982).  
The Federal Circuit adopted the body of law represented by the holdings of the 
Court of Claims and the C.C.P.A. in South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).  The Federal Circuit has exclusive subject matter juris-
diction over all appeals from the federal district courts, the PTO, and the ITC 
arising under the patent laws of the United States.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c), 1295 
(1994); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994). 
61. As the court in Autogiro observed: 
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series 
of drawings.  A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to 
satisfy the requirements of patent law.  This conversion of machine to 
words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily 
filled.  Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe 
it.  The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor.  It can-
not.  Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.  
To overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexi-
cographer. 
384 F.2d at 397 (citations omitted).  The rule that an applicant is entitled to be his 
or her own lexicographer continues to receive explicit endorsement.  See, e.g., 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (citing Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397).  The rule ac-
knowledges that new terms are required to describe new discoveries.  Id.  This, 
too, is a long since acknowledged concept:  “I am not yet so lost in lexicography 
as to forget that words are the daughter of earth, and that things are the sons of 
heaven.”  SAMUEL JOHNSON, Preface to DICTIONARY (1755), quoted in J. BARTLETT, 
BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (16th ed. 1992). 
62. Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397.   
63. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
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penalize inventors for ambiguities or inadequacies of lan-
guage in a patent application.64  Nonetheless, the inventor 
must thoroughly and accurately define any new terms, and 
must use such terms consistently throughout the specifica-
tion and the claims.65 
b. Scientific Principles 
Another challenge to disclosure in the unpredictable arts 
arises where the principles relied upon to explain or describe 
the operation of an invention, are new, untested, and yet to 
be accepted by the scientific community.66  In such a situa-
tion, the inventive principle itself, or at least the inventor’s 
description of it, might be looked upon with suspicion.  
 
64. In Fisher, the court explained: 
We recognize a problem in determining differences over the prior art 
where the claim uses language which is now accepted and precise but 
which was not used in the art at the time the prior-art references were 
published.  However, were we to require that claims speak in the lan-
guage of the prior art, we would be prohibiting the use of newer and 
frequently more precise language of the present art. 
427 F.2d at 838; see also Benger Labs. Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639, 642 
(E.D. Pa. 1962).  As the Benger Laboratories court noted: 
Nothing in the law requires courts to deny a patent to the inventor of a 
new and useful product merely because laboratory technique has not 
advanced to a point where the chemical structure can be recognized 
and described.  All that is necessary is that the patentee make as full 
disclosure as he reasonably can and that he describe the product with 
sufficient particularity that it can be identified and that those who are 
interested in its manufacture are enabled to determine what will and 
what will not infringe. 
Id. 
65. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (“The caveat is that any special 
definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the specification.”) (citing 
Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
66. R.H. Comey Co. v. Monte Christi Corp., 17 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1927) 
(“When [experimentation] is necessary, especially where, as here, it is claimed 
the art is new, courts will carefully appraise the adequacy of the disclosures and 
sustain or strike down the patent accordingly.”) (citations omitted); see also In re 
Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (suggesting that when the operation 
alleged conflicts with recognized principles or is not amenable to testing by 
known scientific principles, applicants will be required to demonstrate the 
workability and utility of the device and make clear the principles by which it 
operates) 
    
164 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:147 
Courts or the PTO might then treat the invention as unpre-
dictable, or not amenable to generalization, and question the 
sufficiency of the disclosure.  When the subject of a patent 
application is among the unpredictable arts, and the applica-
tion contains claims covering subject matter beyond that il-
lustrated in the disclosure, courts and the PTO are likely to 
scrutinize closely the disclosure for enablement.67 
Unpredictable factors are more prevalent in some disci-
plines, thereby complicating the sufficiency of disclosure 
analysis and casting suspicion on broad claims to inventions 
within such disciplines.68  For example, while electrical and 
mechanical inventions are generally considered as among 
the predictable arts,69 inventions involving chemistry70—
 
67. Cf. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming rejection of 
broad generic claims in an unpredictable art, which claims were supported by 
only a single working example). 
68. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also M.P.E.P., supra 
note 16, § 2164.03. 
69. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839.  In Fisher, the C.C.P.A. observed: 
In cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical 
elements, a single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense 
that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty 
and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known sci-
entific laws.  In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most 
chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement 
obviously varies with the degree of unpredictability of the factors in-
volved. 
Id.; accord Ex parte Hitzeman, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1821, 1823 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 
1988) (“noting that a single embodiment may provide broad enablement in cases 
involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, but that 
more is required in cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical 
reactions and physiological activity); see also Matheson v. Campbell, 78 F. 910, 
916 (2d Cir. 1897) (“[A patentee cannot] speculate on the equivalents of his 
claimed invention and thereby oblige the public to resort to experiments in order 
to determine the scope of the claims of his patent.”). 
70. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(“[W]hile analogy is at times useful, organic chemistry is essentially an experi-
mental science and results are often uncertain, unpredictable, and unexpected.”); 
Naylor v. Alsop Process Co., 168 F. 911, 919 (8th Cir. 1909) (“[R]easoning by 
analogy in a complex field like chemistry is very much more restricted than in a 
simple field like mechanics.”); Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. 
Supp. 370, 432 (D. Del. 1980) (“[I]n the notably unpredictable fields of catalysis 
and organic chemistry small changes can yield quite significant results”). 
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including physiological utility or therapeutic uses of com-
pounds,71 living materials such as microorganisms or cul-
tured cells,72 and other aspects of biochemistry and genetic 
manipulation—are generally categorized as among the un-
predictable arts.73  Consequently, broad claims to inventions 
among the latter group of disciplines often receive greater 
scrutiny. 
 
71. See, e.g., Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1705 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Int. 1991) (finding an invention which concerned pharmaceutical activity 
to be relatively unpredictable because there was no record of analogous activity 
for similar compounds); see also In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (ad-
dressing therapeutical compositions comprising mixtures of extracts from plants 
of various enumerated families); In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (ad-
dressing pharmaceutical compositions having “antidepressant activity”); Impe-
rial Chem. Indus. v. Mossinghoff, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 (D.D.C. 1984) (distin-
guishing enablement requirement for claimed compounds from claimed 
therapeutic use:  disclosure requirements for claimed therapeutic use of known 
compounds being greater.); Ex parte Kranz, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Int. 1991) (addressing treatment of cancer); Ex parte Busse, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1908 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986) (addressing treatment of cancer); Ex parte 
Powers, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 924 (Bd. App. 1982) (“[D]isclosure . . . lacks any in-
formation as to host, dosage level, mode or routes of administration, or how to 
prepare the composition for administration.”); cf. In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430 
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (recognizing less stringent requirement for disclosure of “how to 
use” the invention for claims directed to compounds as compared to claims for 
therapeutic use); accord Bey v. Kollonitsch, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 454, 459 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Int. 1981). 
72. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ex parte Humphreys, 
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992); Ex parte Hata, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1652 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988) (deposit of microorganisms required if 
not shown to be “not rarely occurring”).  But see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (con-
cluding it is not undue experimentation to make and screen monoclonal antibod-
ies by hybridoma method). 
73. See, e.g., In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding sin-
gle example in support of claims for method for producing mammalian peptides 
in any plant cell insufficient enablement and acknowledging articles showing 
“great unpredictability in the art”); Hitzeman, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1823 (“[T]his case 
involves highly unpredictable factors including unique, delicate, and unpredict-
able biochemical and genetic actions.”) (citing examiner’s Answer with ap-
proval). 
This Article uses the terms “chemical inventions” and “chemical cases” to in-
clude inventions and claims involving physiological utility or therapeutic uses of 
compounds, living materials such as microorganisms or cultured cells, and other 
aspects of biochemistry and genetic manipulation. 
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One might view this enhanced scrutiny of the unpredict-
able arts as merely healthy skepticism of disciplines that 
trace their roots to the medieval practice of alchemy, which, 
despite its association with chicanery and fraud, is the fore-
runner of modern chemistry and pharmacology.74  Nonethe-
less, it is worthwhile to examine the effect that such en-
hanced scrutiny might have on the scope of protection 
afforded an invention. 
2. The Proper Inquiry:  Unpredictable Factors in the 
Art 
Rather than branding entire disciplines unpredictable, 
the C.C.P.A. has commented that it “would prefer to see the 
dichotomy which lawyers find in the chemical and mechani-
cal cases ‘denominated a dichotomy between predictable 
and unpredictable factors in the art.’  However, we recog-
nize that the realities of chemical cases often result in unpre-
dictability.”75  The court’s attempt to clarify this issue might 
be interpreted as acknowledging that not all chemical inven-
tions are inherently unpredictable. 
3. Assessing Unpredictability and Sufficiency of  
 Disclosure 
a. Standards of Disclosure and Burdens of Proof 
The mere prospect that an invention might be denomi-
nated “unpredictable,” thereby rendering broad claims sus-
pect, raises a preliminary issue:  whether inventions that 
 
74. See N. IRVING SAX AND RICHARD J. LEWIS, SR., HAWLEY’S CONDENSED 
CHEMICAL DICTIONARY 31 (11th ed. 1987) (defining alchemy as:  “The predecessor 
of chemistry practiced from as early as 500 B.C. through the 16th century.  Its 
two principal goals were transmutation of the base metals into gold and discov-
ery of a universal remedy.  Modern chemistry grew out of alchemy by gradual 
stages.”). 
75. In re Bowen, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48, 50 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (citing In re Cook, 
439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).  The distinction is frequently overlooked, 
however.  Judge Rich wrote the opinion in both Bowen and Cook, yet more re-
cently wrote, “it is well settled that patent applicants are not required to disclose 
every species encompassed by their claims, even in an unpredictable art.”  In re 
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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possess unpredictable factors are subject to a more rigorous 
standard of disclosure. 
The Patent Office Board of Appeals has acknowledged 
that the sufficiency of the patent disclosure is more often 
called into question in chemical cases.76  Nonetheless, the 
C.C.P.A. has refuted the suggestion that there is a more rig-
orous standard of disclosure, noting that “the patent code 
does not prescribe a different standard [of disclosure] be-
tween ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ cases; nor does this court ap-
ply different standards in such cases.”77  Nonetheless, the 
burden of proof, as to whether an applicant has satisfied that 
 
76. Ex parte Vickers, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 607, 608 (Bd. App. 1941); see also Na-
tionwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839 (M.D. Fla. 1976), aff’d, 584 
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978).  In Nationwide Chemical Corp., the court distinguished 
treatment of generic mechanical claims from generic claims in chemical and bio-
logical arts and acknowledged that: 
[O]ne skilled in these chemical and biological arts cannot always rea-
sonably predict how different chemical compounds and elements might 
behave under varying circumstances.  Thus, in so-called ‘chemical’ pat-
ent law practice, the claims of a patent are limited by the scope of what 
the disclosure reasonably teaches to one skilled in the art. 
Id.  Furthermore, as the Vickers court explained: 
[T]he rejection is that the claim is broader than the invention.  This 
ground of rejection is frequently applied in purely chemical cases where 
equivalents are not obvious, but is very infrequently applied to strictly 
mechanical cases . . . . The reason for the distinction made between 
chemical and mechanical cases is because in the mechanical cases the 
equivalents are obvious to any mechanic.” 
53 U.S.P.Q. at 608. 
77. In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1064 (1978) (citing In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 589-90 (C.C.P.A. 1972)); see also Ex 
parte DesOrmeaux, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2040, 2043-44 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992) 
(“[W]e are unaware of any distinction in law as to the enablement or description 
requirements of the first paragraph of [section] 112 based on whether the subject 
matter is chemical or non chemical.”).  But see United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 
857 F.2d 778, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Fisher and Bowen both involved chemical reac-
tions, recognized by our predecessor court as having a high degree of unpredict-
ability and therefore requiring an increased enablement disclosure.”); Hormone 
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1386 (N.D. Cal. 
1988), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
cert. dismissed, 499 U.S. 955 (1991) (“Patents concerning chemical reactions and 
biological activity, like the patent in suit, generally involve unpredictable factors 
thus enable a narrower range of claims.”). 
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disclosure requirement can vary.  Courts have acknowl-
edged the propriety of shifting the burden of proof, depend-
ing upon the unpredictability of an invention.78 
b. Measuring the Sufficiency of Disclosure 
The prospect that the burden of proof can shift, depend-
ing upon the perceived unpredictability within an art, raises 
a more challenging question:  how does one reliably meas-
ure the sufficiency of disclosure in disciplines fraught with 
unpredictability?  The proper inquiry is whether there is a 
reasonable correlation between the scope of enablement 
provided by the disclosure and the scope of the claims.79  In 
other words, whether the specification contains a description 
of the invention that would enable one of ordinary skill in 
the relevant art to make and use the invention throughout 
the range of embodiments embraced by the claim.80 
Confirmation that the scope of enablement correlates 
with the scope of the claim is not an arbitrary hurdle erected 
exclusively before the invention possessing unpredictable 
factors.81  Rather, it is a recognition that, regardless of disci-
 
78. See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing the role of un-
predictability in shifting the burden of proof as between the PTO and applicant); 
see also In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
79. See infra note 238 and accompanying text; see also In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 
488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1981); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re 
Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that the first paragraph of sec-
tion 112 requires that the scope of protection sought bear a reasonable correlation 
to the scope of enablement provided by the specification); In re Borkowski, 422 
F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  As the Borkowski court explained: 
[I]f the ‘enabling’ disclosure of a specification is not commensurate in 
scope with the subject matter encompassed by a claim, that fact does 
not render the claim imprecise or indefinite or otherwise not in compli-
ance with the second paragraph of § 112; rather, the claim is based on an 
insufficient disclosure. . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
80. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Although not 
explicitly stated in section 112, to be enabling, the specification of a patent must 
teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed 
invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”) (citations omitted). 
81. The ability to draw generalizations not expressly supported by a disclo-
sure was addressed with characteristic eloquence by Judge Learned Hand: 
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pline, enablement contemplates predictability, or at least the 
ability to duplicate what the applicant claims to have in-
vented.82 
Early in the post-World War II era, the C.C.P.A. gave 
voice to this principle in In re Chilowsky.83  Chilowsky in-
volved claims directed to the use of nuclear fission to gener-
ate useful energy.84  The PTO had rejected the claims on the 
grounds of inoperativeness and indefiniteness.85  The 
C.C.P.A. observed, however, that neither the examiner nor 
the Board of Appeals had identified any specific feature 
shown to be, or considered to be, inoperative, but rather 
merely objected to the speculative nature of the disclosure.86  
Accordingly, the Chilowsky court concluded that the stan-
                                                                                                                                  
An inventor is, of course, not confined to the exact details of his disclo-
sure, else his patent would be of small value.  The extent to which he 
may generalize it depends, not only upon the surrounding pressure of 
the art, but the extent to which the variations which he wishes to cover 
in his claims, are themselves within the initiative of a journeyman in the 
art.  For the inventor’s contribution must be a sufficient guide in itself, 
and its extent is limited to such substitutes for any disclosed element, as 
the art needs no help to find. . . . An inventor must do more than give 
cues for future experiment.  Unless he is dealing with elements whose 
action and reaction is known and certain, he is bound to disclose how 
the combination will operate.  A patent is the reward of a tested contri-
bution to the art, not of a pregnant surmise or promising hypothesis. 
Leonard, Inc. v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 252 F. 584, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1918) (ci-
tations omitted).  Judge Hand’s comments also show that this particular inquiry 
is not peculiar to the unpredictable arts, because the issue before the Leonard 
court was whether the disclosure supported an assertion of the claims against 
alleged equivalents in a mechanical invention.  See generally Leonard, Inc. v. 
Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 252 F. 584 (2d Cir. 1918). 
82. Id.; see also In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 701 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (saying de-
scription must provide measure of predictability for the utility described for the 
invention); Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839, aff’d, 584 
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978) (“With respect to generic claims to chemical and biologi-
cal inventions, the scope of the claim is limited to what those skilled in the art 
could reasonably predict from the inventor’s disclosure.”). 
83. In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
84. Id. at 459. 
85. Id. at 460.  The examiner had argued that in order for there to be pat-
entability for generating power by nuclear fission, “there must be conclusive 
proof” that the disclosed reactor can be constructed and operated.  Id. at 461. 
86. Id. at 461. 
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dards by which operativeness of the invention and enable-
ment are judged should be no different in emerging or un-
predictable technologies than in other more established and 
predictable technologies.87 
Nonetheless, within developing disciplines, unpredict-
ability, alone, might be sufficient to cast doubt on the scope 
of enablement.88  Still greater scrutiny—even a presumption 
of a lack of utility or of inoperability—is appropriate where 
the alleged operation is in actual conflict with recognized 
scientific principles,89 or otherwise commonly acknowledged 
 
87. Chilowsky, 229 F.2d at 461-62.  The Chilowsky court said that: 
[T]he same principles should apply in determining operativeness and 
sufficiency of disclosure in applications relating to nuclear fission as in 
other cases.  There appears to be no basis in the statutes or decisions for 
requiring any more conclusive evidence of operativeness in one type of 
case than another.  The character and amount of evidence needed may 
vary, depending on whether the alleged operation described in the ap-
plication appears to accord with or to contravene established scientific 
principles or to depend upon principles alleged but not generally rec-
ognized; but the degree of certainty as to the ultimate fact of operative-
ness . . . should be the same in all cases. 
Id. 
88. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  In Marzocchi, the court 
observed: 
In the field of chemistry generally, there may be times when the well 
known unpredictability of chemical reactions will alone be enough to 
create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad state-
ment put forward as enabling support for a claim.  This will especially 
be the case where the statement is, on its face, contrary to generally ac-
cepted scientific principles. 
Id. at 223. 
89. Id.; see also In re Chilowski, 229 F.2d at 462 (“[I]f the alleged operation 
seems clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific principle as, for example, 
where an applicant purports to have discovered a machine producing perpetual 
motion, the presumption of inoperativeness is so strong that very clear evidence 
is required to overcome it.”); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(claims for a perpetual motion machine rejected under both sections 101 and 
112), modified, 886 F.2d 329 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); cf. In 
re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1159 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the claimed utility, 
treatment of lymphatic congestion, is not “incredible”).  In a corresponding foot-
note, the court identified a series of cases addressing the issue of whether the 
claimed utility was speculative, incredible, esoteric, factually misleading, or con-
trary to the common knowledge of persons of ordinary skill in the art.  See, e.g., 
In re Houghton, 433 F.2d 820, 820 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (flying machine operating on 
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as the “subject matter of much humbuggery and fraud.”90 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE INQUIRY 
The sufficiency of disclosure inquiry derives from the re-
quirement of section 112, first paragraph that an applicant 
describe his or her invention.91  More particularly, the disclo-
sure must satisfy the written description, enablement, and 
how-to-make-and-use requirements.92  The sufficiency of 
disclosure inquiry has occasionally suffered from the failure 
to distinguish the descriptive requirements of the first para-
graph of section 112 from the definitional requirements of 
the second paragraph—as seen in rejections for undue  
breadth—and from the requirement that the invention be 
useful93—as seen in rejections for including inoperative em-
bodiments.  This part examines the evolution of sufficiency 
of disclosure rejections from those decrying undue breadth 
and faulting the inclusion of inoperative embodiments to the 
current rejections for insufficiency of disclosure alleging the 
need for undue experimentation. 
                                                                                                                                  
“flapping or flutter function”); In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (con-
trol of aging process); In re Buting, 418 F.2d 540 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (treating cancer); 
In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (hair restorer); In re Citron, 325 F.2d 
254 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (treating cancer)).  Id. at 1159 n.5. 
90. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 180 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled on other grounds 
by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).  The Nelson court also cited In re Ober-
weger.  Id. (citing In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1940)) (“[W]herein an 
invention consisting of various admixtures of such things as bone marrow, aro-
matic oils and alcohol was held lacking in utility for the specified purpose of 
growing hair.”). 
91. See, e.g., In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that 
whether the claims read on subject matter for which the specification is enabling 
is an issue of paragraph one of section 112). 
92. The various insufficiency of disclosure rejections have been categorized 
elsewhere.  See generally Walterscheid (pt. III), supra note 14. 
93. See, e.g., In re Frilette, 423 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that rejection 
that claims were “too broad” confused the requirements of the first and second 
paragraphs of section 112, and section 101 (utility)); see generally CHISUM, supra 
note 6, §§ 7.02-.03, 8.03. 
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A. Undue Breadth:  Distinguishing the Obligation to Define 
from the Obligation to Describe the Invention 
In the past, the PTO has rejected patent applications for 
insufficiency of disclosure by alleging that the inventor’s 
claims were unduly broad.94  Such “undue breadth” rejec-
tions are now disfavored, as they fail to distinguish between 
an alleged inadequacy of the claims or the disclosure.95 
The sufficiency of disclosure analysis has often been con-
founded by the failure to distinguish the obligation to de-
fine, or delineate the boundaries of the invention, from the 
obligation to disclose or describe the invention.96  The appli-
cant’s definition of the invention must “particularly point 
out and distinctly claim” what the applicant regards as the 
invention.97  Because the applicant has the obligation of de-
fining the invention in the first instance, the application—
and the sufficiency of the disclosure—must be analyzed with 
respect to the invention as claimed.98 
1.  The Claim Defines That Which Must Separately 
Be  Described 
When considering whether an application sufficiently 
describes an invention, one must first determine what the 
invention is.99  The first paragraph of section 112 requires 
that the applicant enable one of skill in the art to make and 
 
94. See, e.g., In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Frilette, 423 
F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
95. See Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 909; Frilette, 423 F.2d at 1400-01. 
96. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
97. The obligation to define the invention is found in the first paragraph of 
section 112, and obligates the applicant to define the exclusive right sought by 
“particularly point[ing] out and distinctly claim[ing]” that which the applicant 
regards as the invention.  35 U.S.C. § 112; see supra notes 41-54 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the statutory requirements of disclosure).  The sufficiency of 
the disclosure must meet the strictures of the first paragraph of section 112.  See 
supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text (explaining the statutory requirements 
of disclosure). 
98. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 501-02 (citing In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 
(C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
99. Id. 
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use the invention; the second paragraph requires that the 
applicant define the scope of the invention.100  Because an 
invention must first be defined in order to ascertain whether 
it is enabled, a proper analysis for compliance with section 
112 must start with the second paragraph.101 
The test for compliance with section 112, second para-
graph, is whether the claims “set out and circumscribe a par-
ticular area with a reasonable degree of precision and par-
ticularity.”102 
If so, the applicant has satisfied the requirements of the 
second paragraph of section 112.103  If, however, the “ena-
bling” disclosure of a specification is not commensurate in 
scope with the subject matter encompassed by a claim, the 
claim is based on an insufficient disclosure, and the issue be-
comes one of compliance with section 112, first paragraph.104  
In such situations, it is important to distinguish the require-
ment of definiteness, which the claims must meet, from en-




102. Id.; see also, Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 874-75 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993).  In Miles, the court explained: 
The “distinctly claiming” requirement means that the claims must have 
a clear and definite meaning when construed in the light of the com-
plete patent document.  Section 112 thus ensures definiteness of claim 
language. 
The test for definiteness is whether one skilled in the art would un-
derstand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification.  
If the claims read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those 
skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, [section] 112 demands no 
more.  The degree of precision necessary for adequate claims is a func-
tion of the nature of the subject matter. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Put another way: 
If the scope of subject matter embraced by a claim is clear, and if the 
applicant has not otherwise indicated that he intends the claim to be of 
a different scope, then the claim does particularly point out and dis-
tinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his in-
vention. 
Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 909. 
103. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 501-02. 
104. Id. 
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meet.105 
2. Undue Breadth Fails to Distinguish Definitional 
from Descriptive Faults 
The distinct requirements of the first and second para-
graphs of section 112 have occasionally been muddled.106  
The result is highlighted in the debate over whether claims 
might properly be rejected for undue breadth.107  Because of 
inherent ambiguities and resulting confusion, the undue 
breadth rejection was explicitly spurned by the C.C.P.A. in 
In re Borkowski.108 
 
105. See CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03; see also In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 261 
(C.C.P.A. 1963).  As the Fuetterer court explained:  “[w]e think the examiner’s re-
jection of the instant claims as failing to enable the public to ‘determine operable 
proportions’ is misplaced.  Such is the function of the invention description and 
not that of the claims.”  Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  But see 
General Electric Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 745 (Ct. Cl. 1978).  In General Elec-
tric, the court noted: 
Claims 35 and 36 fail to structurally recite, in any form, transformer 81.  
This element is an essential element of the combination for without 
transformer 81, or some equivalent means, the claimed combination is 
inoperative. . . . Since the combination as claimed is inoperative for its 
claimed purpose, the patentee has failed to distinctly claim the dis-
closed invention as required by the second paragraph of [section] 112. 
Id. at 754 (citations omitted). 
106. See generally CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03 (discussing several Supreme 
Court cases confusing the distinction); Levin, supra note 67 (explaining that some 
courts confuse the first and second paragraphs of section 112).  Much of the con-
fusion can be attributed to the fact that under prior patent acts the enablement 
requirement and the “distinctly claiming” requirement were expressed within 
the same sentence.  With the Patent Act of 1952, however, those requirements 
were expressed in separate paragraphs of section 112.  See supra notes 20-25 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Patent Act of 1952).  One commentator has 
explained: 
In the old statute, the requirement for a claim pointing out what the ap-
plicant regarded as his invention appeared as a clause in the same sen-
tence relating to the description, which led to some confounding of the 
nature of the two requirements in a few decisions.  In the new statute, 
the clause relating to the claim has been made a separate paragraph to 
emphasize the distinction between the description and the claim, and 
the language has been modified. 
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 157, 186 (1993). 
107. See, e.g., In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Fuetterer, 
319 F.2d 259 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
108. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
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In Borkowski, the examiner had rejected the claims in is-
sue under both the first and second paragraphs of section 
112; specifically, the examiner asserted that the claims were 
“based on an insufficient disclosure,” and failed to “particu-
larly point out and distinctly claim the invention.”109  The 
court suggested that the undue breadth rejection begs the 
question as to whether the applicant has failed to enable the 
invention as broadly as it is claimed, or has failed to claim 
clearly and with particularity that which is disclosed and 
presumably enabled.110 
The C.C.P.A. has also made clear its view that undue 
breadth is an ambivalent rejection from which neither the 
applicant nor appellate tribunals can decipher the deficiency 
alleged.111  Furthermore, the C.C.P.A. has observed that the 
undue breadth rejection might suggest inoperativeness—
that embodiments within the scope of the claims lack util-
ity—and thus an implicit rejection under section 101.112  Ac-
cordingly, the undue breadth rejection, without more, is in-
appropriate and should not stand.113  In fact, the rejection is 





111. Frilette, 423 F.2d at 1400-01. 
112. Id. (“Thus, while citing [section] 112, the board’s discussion of the fac-
tual grounds for the rejection indicates, as does the examiner’s, a concern with 
alleged inoperativeness or lack of utility of embodiments embraceable within the 
scope of the language of the claims.”). 
113. Id. (remanding for clarification a rejection of claims under section 112 
asserting claims were “too broad”). 
114. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he claim is prop-
erly rejected for what used to be known as ‘undue breadth,’ but has since been 
appreciated as being, more accurately, based upon the first paragraph of [sec-
tion] 112.”); see generally M.P.E.P., supra note 16 (eliminating section 706.03(z) 
from the previous edition, which expressly provided grounds for rejecting claims 
for “Undue Breadth,” particularly among the unpredictable arts such as those 
involving chemical reactions).  Similarly, section 706.03(n) has also been elimi-
nated from the most recent edition of the M.P.E.P.  See generally id.  That section, 
entitled “Correspondence of Claim & Disclosure” was often used by examiners 
in tandem with section 706.03(z) to reject claims based upon the first paragraph 
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Sufficiency of disclosure, then, addresses compliance 
with the requirements of section 112, first paragraph.  Within 
the first paragraph, however, there are the three subsidiary 
requirements particularly relevant in the unpredictable arts:  
(1) written description, (2) enablement, and (3) how to make 
and use the invention.115  Satisfaction of these requirements 
is often debated in conjunction with the invention’s utility.116 
B. Inoperative Embodiments and the Utility Component of 
Disclosure 
Another now disfavored form of insufficiency of disclo-
sure rejection is the allegation that the claim embraces inop-
erative embodiments.  As with undue breadth, inoperative 
embodiment rejections confuse the respective requirements 
of the first and second paragraphs of section 112, as well as 
the utility requirement of section 101.117 
The invention and the description of the invention are 
separate contrivances:118  the utility requirement demands 
the invention be useful, while the disclosure requirement 
demands that the written description of the invention enable 
one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the inven-
tion.119  The inoperative embodiment rejection, like the un-
due breadth rejection, suffered from misguided reasoning 
and inherent ambiguity.  The demise of both rejections was 
the genesis of the modern undue experimentation inquiry. 
                                                                                                                                  
of section 112.  See generally id.  Such rejections are now controlled by new 
M.P.E.P. § 706.03(c), entitled “Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, First Paragraph.”  
Such rejections are discussed at length in M.P.E.P. Chapter 2100.  See generally id. 
§ 2164 (reiterating the principles and grounds formerly found in sections 
706.03(n),(z)). 
115. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
116. See, e.g., In re Frilette, 423 F.2d 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that the first 
paragraph of section 112 requires “enabling” disclosure). 
117. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. 
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1. Utility and Disclosure of Utility 
As explained above in Part I, the subject of an application 
for a utility patent must be useful.120  While the utility re-
quirement is found in section 101, it is also embraced by sec-
tion 112.121  Indeed, the C.C.P.A. has held that compliance 
with section 112 contemplates satisfaction of section 101.122 
Furthermore, in Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,123 the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, affirming a lower court’s 
holding that a patent application was invalid for lack of util-
ity, confirmed that a rejection for lack of utility can properly 
be made under either section 101 or section 112.124 
Nonetheless, the requirements of these two sections are 
 
120. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
121. See generally M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2107(d). 
122. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967).  In Kirk, the court ex-
plained: 
[S]urely Congress intended [section] 112 to pre-suppose full satisfaction 
of the requirements of [section] 101.  Necessarily, compliance with [sec-
tion] 112 requires a description of how to use presently useful inven-
tions, otherwise an applicant would anomalously be required to teach 
how to use a useless invention. 
Id. at 942 (emphasis in original). 
123. 724 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984). 
124. Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 956.  In Raytheon, the court noted that: 
Because it is for the invention as claimed that enablement must exist, 
and because the impossible cannot be enabled, a claim containing a 
limitation impossible to meet may be held invalid under [section] 112.  
Moreover, when a claim requires a means for accomplishing an unat-
tainable result, the claimed invention must be considered inoperative as 
claimed and the claim must be held invalid under either [section] 101 or 
[section] 112 . . . . 
Id.; see also M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.07 (“Relationship of Enablement Re-
quirement to Utility Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101”), § 2107.02 (“Special Con-
siderations for Asserted Therapeutic or Pharmacologic Utilities”); U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR CONSIDERING DISCLOSURES OF UTILITY IN DRUG 
CASES 567 (1968) [hereinafter PTO DRUG UTILITY GUIDELINES] (providing a histori-
cal discussion of disclosure in chemical cases); cf. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (1995).  If an applicant 
has not stated a utility, and the claimed invention does not have a well estab-
lished utility, examiners should interpose a rejection under both sections 101 and 
112.  Id. at 36,264.  This should shift the burden to the applicant to:  (1) identify a 
utility, and (2) show support for that utility in the specification.  Id. 
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distinct.  The C.C.P.A. has admonished that “‘utility’ as re-
quired by section 101 and a showing of ‘how to use’ the in-
vention as required by the first paragraph of section 112 
should not be confused as has often been done by courts, in-
cluding this court in In re Bremner . . . .”125  Such confusion 
occasionally results in sufficiency of disclosure rejections 
based upon the utility requirement of section 112.126 
The C.C.P.A. examined the distinction between section 
101 and section 112 in considerable detail in In re Nelson.127  
The Nelson court noted that the utility requirement of section 
101 is intended to limit the grant of patents to “useful” in-
ventions.128  As such, section 101 limits the granting of pat-
ents to certain classes of invention—that is, those possessing 
utility.  It is therefore inappropriate to rely upon section 112 
to object to the kind of utility disclosed.129  If the invention 
possesses utility and the subject matter otherwise comes 
within the classes of patentable subject matter, the invention 
complies with section 101.130  Thus, “section 112, as we view 
the matter, does not deal with ‘utility,’ in the sense in which 
that term is used in patent law to define a prerequisite to 
patentability.”131 
 
125. In re Szwarc, 319 F.2d 277, 284 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (citing In re Bremner, 
182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950)); cf. In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 
1971).  As the Fouche court observed: 
It appears that the examiner and the board doubted that compositions 
having heterocyclic moieties would be useful at all for therapeutic pur-
poses.  While this position could have led to a rejection under [section] 
101, it also leads to a rejection under the how-to-use provision of [sec-
tion] 112, since if such compositions are in fact useless, appellant’s 
specification cannot have taught how to use them.) 
Id. 
126. See, e.g., Parker & Wasson v. Biel, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 613 (Bd. Pat. App. 
& Int. 1961); see also M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.07. 
127. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled on other grounds by 
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
128. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 178. 
129. Id. at 177. 
130. Id. at 178. 
131. Id. 
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2. The Written Description Requirement 
The call for a written description has been interpreted as 
fulfilling a dual purpose in the unpredictable arts.132  Re-
gardless of discipline, the requirement is first a modifier ex-
plaining how the disclosure shall be effected.133  Where the 
invention is rooted in the unpredictable arts, the written de-
scription has additionally been interpreted as a separate re-
quirement by which the applicant demonstrates an apprecia-
tion for the utility and breadth of the invention.134  Thus, the 
written description is an independent, and occasionally dis-
positive, requirement.135  As a dispositive issue, however, it 
is rarely raised outside the unpredictable arts.136 
The written description is the mechanism whereby the 
applicant establishes that he or she was in possession of the 
invention at the time of filing.  That is, the application, taken 
together with the prior art, should explicitly document the 
 
132. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1561. 
135. In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 864 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see also In re Barker, 559 
F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). 
136. Cf. Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Markey, Chief J., dissenting).  In Barker, the 
court sustained a section 112 written description rejection in an uncomplicated 
mechanical case.  See generally In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).  Judge Markey disagreed with the imposition of this 
“separate description requirement” in such cases.  Id. at 594  Nonetheless, he ac-
knowledged the propriety of such a separate description requirement in complex 
chemical cases.  Id. 
Unlike mechanical inventions, a description of a new composition of matter 
does not necessarily carry with it a description of how to make or how to use the 
invention, or its reasonable equivalents.  See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 
(C.C.P.A. 1970).  When this is so, it is incumbent upon applicant to show that he 
or she was in possession of the invention at the time of filing by demonstrating 
an appreciation for the utility and breadth of the invention as now claimed.  See 
In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184-85 (C.C.P.A. 1960). 
As a practical matter, however, the written description requirement cannot 
be wholly divorced from the enablement and how-to-use requirements, for if 
they are not met, surely the written description requirement is not met.  Thus, 
reliance on the call for a written description as a separate requirement should be 
made sparingly. 
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utility of the invention, how to make and use the invention, 
and the contemplated breadth of the invention.137 
Courts have held that an applicant can satisfy the en-
ablement and how-to-use requirements, yet fail to comply 
with the written description requirement.138  This is further 
confirmation that the written description requirement is dis-
tinct from the enablement or how-to-use requirements.139 
The issue of compliance with a separate written descrip-
tion requirement might arise through the practice of amend-
ing claims during the course of prosecuting a patent applica-
tion.140  By way of such amendments, an applicant redefines 
the invention; in so doing, the applicant might fortuitously 
teach how to use the invention and enable its use, without ac-
tually disclosing that particular invention in the original ap-
plication.141  In other words, the addition of the limitation 
within the claim might enable the claimed invention, and the 
pre-existing disclosure might have taught how to use the in-
vention, but the new limitation, if unsupported by the writ-
 
137. In a mechanism that is beyond the scope of this Article, applicants may 
alternatively fulfill the “written description” requirement in the case of biological 
materials by making a deposit of the material in a recognized depository.  See 
generally M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2402. 
138. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561-62 (citing In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 
1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Barker, 
559 F.2d at 591; In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[I]t is possi-
ble for a specification to enable the practice of an invention as broadly as it is 
claimed, and still not describe that invention.”) (emphasis in original). 
139. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563.  In Vas-Cath, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that: 
The purpose of the ‘written description’ requirement is broader than to 
merely explain how to ‘make and use’; the applicant must also convey 
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing 
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.  The invention 
is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now 
claimed. 
Id. at 1563-64. 
140. See, e.g., In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also In re 
Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
141. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, what-
ever is now claimed.”). 
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ten description of the specification as filed, might not have 
been appreciated as material to a description necessarily cir-
cumscribing the invention.142 
When the original disclosure lacks supporting disclosure 
that is material to the disclosure of the invention, such 
amendments constitute an impermissible attempt to intro-
duce new matter to the application.143  This issue typically 
arises where a particular feature is subsequently recognized 
as imparting a distinct patentable advantage, or is necessary 
to overcome a prior art reference or other barrier to pat-
entability.  For example, an applicant might attempt to 
amend a claim during examination (or reissue) of the appli-
cation;144 alternatively, an applicant might claim the benefit 
 
142. See generally Ex parte Grasselli, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393 (Pat. Bd. App. & 
Inf. 1983), on request for rehearing, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 395 (Pat. Bd. App. & Inf. 
1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unpublished). 
143. The introduction of new matter into a patent application is prohibited by 
statute.  35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 251 (1994); see also M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 706.03(o) 
(governing rejections based upon “new matter”).  A brief but informative de-
scription of the term and discussion of the prohibition is found in In re Oda: 
‘New matter’ is a technical legal term in patent law—a term of art.  Its 
meaning has never been clearly defined for it cannot be.  The term is on 
a par with such terms as infringement, obviousness, priority, abandon-
ment and the like which express ultimate legal conclusions and are in 
the nature of labels attached to results after they have been reached by 
processes of reasoning grounded on analyses of factual situations.  In 
other words, the statute gives us no help in determining what is or is 
not ‘new matter.’  We have to decide on a case-by-case basis what 
changes are prohibited as ‘new matter’ and what changes are not. 
443 F.2d 1200, 1203 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.04[1].  As 
this passage suggests, a determination of what constitutes new matter is a com-
plex and fact specific endeavor.  See id.  While a detailed treatment of the subject 
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is helpful to recall the public policy objec-
tives underlying disclosure.  See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.  The 
type of new matter that is proscribed by the Patent Act is that which is not other-
wise available to one of ordinary skill in the art.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 251.  That 
is, if the subject matter sought to be introduced to the application is such that it 
would not have been readily available from the prior art nor obvious to one of 
ordinary skill in the art over the teaching of the specification taken together with 
the prior art, it is likely to be found to be new matter.  See id.  Viewed from this 
perspective, new matter is the inverse of enablement.  See infra part II.B.2.b (dis-
cussing enablement more fully). 
144. See, e.g., In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (finding that 
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of the earlier filing date of a related application145 when, in 
fact, the applicant introduced in a later-filed application a 
written description of the invention that he or she now 
claims.146  This later scenario might arise when an applicant 
claims the benefit of an earlier priority date in the U.S. coun-
terpart of a foreign filed application, or in a domestic con-
tinuation-in-part application.147 
Because of the benefits and advantages conferred on an 
applicant as of the filing date of the application,148 courts and 
the PTO measure enablement as of the filing date and strictly 
prohibit applicants from later introducing into the applica-
tion new matter that is material to the invention.149 
3. Enabling One to Make and Use the Invention 
Beyond the formal requirement of a written description, 
an applicant’s disclosure must enable one of ordinary skill in 
the art to make and use the invention.150  Although these two 
facets of disclosure—enablement and how to make and use 
the invention— are often addressed interchangeably, they 
are distinct requirements.151  The two requirements are also 
rightly, but sometimes confusingly, addressed when the util-
ity of the invention is at issue.152  This sub-section first dis-
                                                                                                                                  
disclosure cannot be made sufficient while the application is pending by later 
publications which enable the invention). 
145. The related application may be filed under either sections 119 or 120. 
146. See, e.g., Glass, 492 F.2d at 1232. 
147. See, e.g., id. 
148. See, e.g., id. (noting that the filing date becomes a date of constructive 
reduction to practice). 
149. See, e.g., id.; Oda, 443 F.2d at 1203-04; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 251; 37 
C.F.R. § 1.118 (1996); M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 608.04. 
150. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
151. See generally CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[5] (discussing the how-to-
make requirement), § 7.03[6] (discussing the how-to-use requirement). 
152. Id. at § 7.03[6].  As explained in the Chisum treatise: 
There is a close relation between the how-to-use aspect of the enable-
ment requirement under [s]ection 112 and the utility requirement under 
[s]ection 101.  If a patent claim fails to meet the utility requirement be-
cause it is not shown to be useful or operative, then it equally fails to 
meet the how-to-use aspect of the enablement requirement. 
Id. 
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cusses the more particular how-to-make-and-use require-
ments, and second the more general enablement require-
ment. 
a. The How-to-Make and How-to-Use 
Requirements 
The how-to-make requirement demands that the disclo-
sure be sufficiently complete so as to teach one of ordinary 
skill in the relevant art how to make the invention.153  The 
requirement principally addresses the disclosure of essential 
starting materials to ensure public availability consistent 
with the objectives of the patent system.154 
The issue of compliance with the how-to-use requirement 
of section 112 often arises in the context of establishing an 
appreciation for the utility of an invention.155  According to 
the C.C.P.A., the test for compliance is what the application 
communicates, implicitly and explicitly, to the skilled practi-
tioner.156 
 
153. See generally id. § 7.03[5]. 
154. Id. (suggesting that the application of the how-to-make requirement, in 
the context of the unpredictable arts, principally addresses the need for the de-
posit of biological materials in a public depository as a means for complying 
with the various requirements of the first paragraph of section 112).  That subject 
is outside the scope of this Article, and is not addressed further. 
155. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960). 
156. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 184-85.  In Nelson, the court stated: 
[T]he test is what the application as a whole communicates to one skilled 
in the art.  In some cases an applicant may, merely by naming his new 
instrument or material, indicate what its use is, as, for example, by say-
ing he has invented a ‘match,’ ‘hammer,’ ‘paint,’ ‘adhesive,’ or ‘deter-
gent.’  He may or may not have to go further in order to enable others to 
use the invention, depending on its nature and how much those of or-
dinary skill in the art know.  In other words, compliance with the law 
does not necessarily require specific recitations of use but may be inher-
ent in description or may result from disclosure of a sufficient number 
of properties to make a use obvious; and where those of ordinary skill 
in the art will know how to use, the applicant has a right to rely on such 
knowledge.  If it will not be sufficient to enable them to use his inven-
tion, he must supply the know-how.  As this court has often said before, 
each case must be judged on its own facts. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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Failure to disclose how to use the invention is an occa-
sionally fatal infirmity in the unpredictable arts.157  In In re 
Kirk,158 for example, the C.C.P.A. held that the applicants 
had failed to disclose how to use their invention, by describ-
ing their invention merely as a new class of compounds often 
possessing high biological activity.159  In substance, the court 
agreed with the examiner that what the “applicants are 
really saying to those in the art is take these steroids, ex-
periment, and find what use they do have as medicines.”160  
The examiner had refused to consider the applicants’ affida-
vit showing that three of the claimed compounds do, in fact, 
possess specific anabolic, anti-inflammatory, or glucocorti-
coid activity, or usefulness as oral progestational agents.161  
The court agreed, characterizing the affidavit as “simply an 
ex post facto affirmation irrelevant to the issue of adequacy 
of the original disclosure inasmuch as it attempts to add 
statements of usefulness to the disclosure of the application 
as filed.”162 
Implicit in the Kirk court’s reasoning is the recognition 
that the affidavit established that the claimed compounds 
possessed utility.163  The claims were thus directed to pat-
entable subject matter in compliance with section 101.  The 
 
157. See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
158. 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
159. 376 F.2d at 938.  In Kirk, the court explained: 
It seems to us that the nebulous expressions ‘biological activity’ or ‘bio-
logical properties’ appearing in the specification convey no more ex-
plicit indication of the usefulness of the compounds and how to use 
them than did the equally obscure expression ‘useful for [sic] technical 
and pharmaceutical purposes’ unsuccessfully relied upon by the appel-
lant in In re Diedrich. 
Id. at 941 (citation omitted); cf. In re Johnson, 282 F.2d 370, 371 (C.C.P.A. 1960) 
(satisfying the how-to-use requirement by stating “the products of the aforesaid 
process are valuable as chemical intermediates for organic synthesis, for solvent 
uses and for the preparation of toxic substances such as insecticides, fungicides, etc.”) 
(emphasis added). 
160. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 940. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 941. 
163. See generally id. at 940-41. 
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fatal infirmity, however, was the applicants’ failure to in-
clude the recitation of utility in the original disclosure.164  
The proscription against adding new matter prevented the 
applicants from entering the information into the disclosure 
during examination.165  Thus, the application, as originally 
filed, failed to teach how to use the invention.166  Notwith-
standing, the Kirk court affirmed the examiner’s rejection of 
the claims under both sections 101 and 112.167 
Kirk perpetuated the confusion between Sections 101 and 
112 that the Nelson court had attempted to eliminate.168  In 
Nelson, the court built upon its own precedent, In re 
Bremner,169 which, while eschewing any “hard and fast” rule 
on disclosure of “utility” in a specification, held that the law 
required “an assertion of utility and an indication of the use or 
uses intended.”170  The Nelson court observed that Bremner had 
already established that “applicants’ specification has to indi-
cate the intended use or uses, which is a requirement distinct 
from the mere possession of ‘utility.’”171 
 
164. Id. at 941. 
165. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.118 (1996); M.P.E.P., supra note 
16, § 608.04. 
166. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 940-41. 
167. Id. at 941-42. 
168. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183. 
169. 182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950). 
170. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183 (quoting Bremner, 182 F.2d at 217) (emphasis in 
original).  The court clarified the precedential value of Bremner by explaining: 
The first law point discussed in the Bremner opinion was that a patent 
specification is required by law to assert ‘utility’ and the factual finding 
was that it did not.  We find on review of the record that the court was 
mistaken  in saying there was no assertion of utility, for the opening 
statement of the Bremner et al. specification was that the invention was 
‘new and useful.’ Upon reflection, we are now of the opinion that a mere 
assertion of utility in a specification is a meaningless formality and no 
more required by law than an assertion of novelty.  We think it only 
reasonable to infer from the fact of filing an application that the appli-
cant asserts that the invention is new and useful, for unless it is both he 
has no right to a patent. 
Id. at 183 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
171. Id.  But see M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.07 (suggesting that section 101 
requires that some use be set forth for the invention, and that the use be provable 
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Nelson suggests that an invention either does or does not 
inherently possesses utility under section 101,172 irrespective 
of an applicant’s compliance with the disclosure require-
ment.173  It follows, then, that evidence of utility is entitled to 
consideration at any time; it is not subject to the proscription 
against the introduction of new matter.174  If, however, the 
disclosure fails to describe, implicitly or explicitly, an appre-
ciation for that utility and how to use the invention, the ap-
plicant has not complied with the first paragraph of section 
112—an infirmity that cannot be corrected by an ex post facto 
(or nunc pro tunc) affidavit, or any other evidence extrinsic to 
the application.175 
b. The Enablement Requirement 
As with the how-to-make-and-use requirements, the 
general enablement requirement has a utility component, in 
that the applicant must supply others with the means or 
knowledge necessary to successfully exploit the invention.176 
This Article proposes that satisfaction of the enablement 
requirement is properly addressed after confirming satisfac-
tion of both the written description requirement and the 
how-to-use requirement.  For example, the invention might 
possess utility (section 101); in addition, the applicant might 
have correctly contemplated and expressed that utility (writ-
ten description); finally, the applicant also might have de-
                                                                                                                                  
and not against public policy).  Nelson characterizes the section 101 requirement 
as satisfied by the mere possession of utility regardless what is “set forth.”  See 
Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183. 
172. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 183. 
173. Id. at 184.  In Nelson, the court acknowledged: 
Much confused thinking on this matter has resulted from a failure to 
separate the requirement of [s]ection 101 that an invention be useful 
from the [s]ection 112 requirement that a specification shall so explain 
‘the manner and process of . . . using’ the invention as to ‘enable any 
person skilled in the art . . . to . . . use the same.’ 
Id. 
174. See, e.g., id. 
175. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 941. 
176. See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
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scribed the manner in which that utility can be exploited 
(how-to-use).  Nonetheless, the applicant must also supply 
the means or knowledge necessary to actually exploit the 
claimed invention in its entirety (enablement).177 
i. Inoperative Embodiments 
The utility/how-to-use/enablement conundrum comes 
to the fore in rejections alleging that the claim embraces in-
operative embodiments.  Extension of the invention beyond 
illustrated embodiments involves inductive reasoning.178  
Extrapolating from demonstrated specifics, the inventor 
proposes, explicitly or implicitly, a more general theory to 
claim the invention broadly.179  These broader claims incor-
porate a generalization of the invention, or specify contem-
plated alternative functional components or features (what 
the patent practitioner refers to as “equivalents”).180  Such ex-
trapolation is a path riddled with pitfalls.  The traditions of 
scientific inquiry caution small, incremental steps,181 while 
inventors occasionally urge large, inferential leaps.182 
 
177. Cf. Cook, 439 F.2d at 736 (“Section 112 requires not that the specifica-
tions merely say how to use the claimed invention, but that such teaching be 
true, i.e. in fact enabling.”). 
178. See Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 
683-85 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). 
179. Id. 
180. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043-45 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
181. Cf. REMINGTON’S PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES 8 (Alfonso R. Gennaro et al. 
eds., 1985) (extolling the fundamentals of the scientific method seen in the writ-
ings and practices of Hippocrates and followers—that is, observation and classi-
fication, rejection of unsupported theory and superstition, and a cautious gener-
alization and induction that remained open to critical discussion and revision). 
182. See, e.g., Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 
465, 472 (1895).  In addressing a charge of infringement against Edison for his use 
of particular fibrous portions of bamboo plant in his new long lasting electric 
light bulbs, the court stated (despite the complainant’s prior art patent teaching 
the use of “fibrous” material but with only narrow exemplification): 
Is the complainant entitled to a monopoly of all fibrous and textile ma-
terials for incandescent conductors?  If the patentees had discovered in 
fibrous and textile substances a quality common to them all, or to them 
generally, as distinguishing them from other materials, such as miner-
als, etc., and such quality or characteristic adapted them peculiarly to 
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Inductive reasoning presents particular problems in the 
unpredictable arts.183  In predictable cases, equivalents—
alternative but functional features—can be envisioned a pri-
ori.  Unpredictability is wrought by the inability to so envi-
sion such equivalents.  Likewise, an applicant might be un-
able to draw an “obvious” equivalent from the prior art.184  
One reason for this inability might be that there is less art 
from which to draw; alternatively, the applicant might be 
unable to draw an obvious equivalent because the teachings 
of the relevant art are inapplicable to the peculiarities of the 
present invention. 
Claims resulting from inductive reasoning in the unpre-
dictable arts raise the possibility that the invention does not 
                                                                                                                                  
incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too broad. . . . Sawyer 
and Man supposed they had discovered in carbonized paper the best 
material for an incandescent conductor.  Instead of confining them-
selves to carbonized paper, as they might properly have done, and in 
fact did in their third claim, they made a broad claim for every fibrous 
or textile material, when in fact an examination of over 6,000 vegetable 
growths showed that none of them possessed the peculiar qualities that 
fitted them for that purpose.  Was everybody, then, precluded by this 
broad claim from making further investigation?  We think not. 
Id. at 472; see, e.g., Todaro, supra note 13, at 37 (“Applicants in the field of bio-
technology often seek claims that are undeniably broad in the light of the specifi-
cation.”). 
183. Cf. CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[4][d] (“A recurring problem is whether 
a specification that sets forth a single or a limited number of examples can be 
enabling of broad claims when the subject matter concerns biological materials 
or reactions, which are generally considered to be unpredictable.”). 
184. See Charles L. Gholz, Recent Developments in the C.C.P.A. Relating to the 
First Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Conclusion), 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 1, 4 (1973).  
According to one commentator: 
It should be noted that ‘obvious’ in the [section] 112 sense does not 
mean the same things as ‘obvious’ in the [section] 103 sense.  While the 
authorities are not uniform, the majority view appears to be that the 
‘person skilled in the art’ referred to in . . . [section] 112 is not presumed 
to know all the obscure, arcane art presumed to be known by [section] 
103’s ‘person having ordinary skill in the art.’ 
Id. at 20 n.152 (citation omitted).  But see CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[2](a), (b) 
(“Although few decisions consider the question explicitly, it would seem that the 
‘person skilled in the art” within the meaning of section 112 is the same as the 
person having “ordinary skill in the art’ within the meaning of Section 103 on 
nonobviousness.”). 
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possess the utility alleged throughout the claimed scope.185  
In the past, this possibility resulted in enablement rejections 
alleging that the claims would be expected to embrace inop-
erative embodiments.186  As explained below, however, the 
proper inquiry is twofold.  The first question is whether the 
invention possesses the specified utility throughout the 
scope of the claim, regardless of whether there are inopera-
tive embodiments within that scope.  The second question is 
whether one of ordinary skill in the relevant art could ex-
ploit that utility throughout the scope of the claim on the 
strength of the applicant’s disclosure. 
ii. Constructively Inoperative, Actually 
Inoperative, and the Burden of Proof 
Claims have suffered enablement rejections for being ei-
ther constructively or actually possessed of inoperative em-
bodiments.187  Those rejections would arise, for example, 
when an applicant claims that an invention has a particular 
range of application without presenting confirming data.  To 
avoid granting broad exclusivity on the basis of unsup-
ported statements, the PTO might challenge the applica-
tion’s enablement by alleging that the claims would be ex-
pected to embrace inoperative embodiments.  To do so 
successfully, the PTO must either show that the supporting 
 
185. See generally Herbert H. Goodman, The Invalidation of Generic Claims for 
Inclusion of a Small Number of Inoperative Species, 40 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 745 (1958) 
(outlining some of the “unique problems” arising in drafting chemical claims in-
volving inductive reasoning from limited examples). 
186. Id.; see also Gholz, supra note 184 (addressing clarification in the “Broad-
Enough-to-Read-on-Inoperative-Subject-Matter-Rejections); H. Einhorn, The En-
forceability of Patent Claims Encompassing Some Inoperative Species, 45 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 716 (1963). 
187. This Article uses the term, constructively inoperative, in reference to 
claims which could be construed as embracing inoperative embodiments, but 
which such embodiments would not be selected by one of ordinary skill in the 
art because it would be apparent, a priori, that such embodiments would be in-
operative; use of “actually inoperative” refers to claims embracing inoperative 
embodiments but where it is not possible to discern which embodiments will be 
inoperative, a priori.  The significance of the distinction is discussed further be-
low. 
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statements are inaccurate, or explain why the written de-
scription does not enable the invention throughout the scope 
of the claim.188 
Before the C.C.P.A. had definitively resolved this issue, 
one commentator suggested that the likelihood of success of 
a challenge to the validity of a patent on the grounds of in-
clusion of inoperative embodiments in an infringement con-
text was a function of equity.189  In other words, the com-
mentator posited that courts would strive to preclude an 
accused infringer from successfully asserting an inoperative-
embodiments challenge when the infringer was exploiting 
the invention consistent with the plain teaching of the pat-
ent.190 
Another commentator noted that “[t]he inventor gains 
nothing, nor is the public foreclosed, by claiming ‘more than 
the invention’ where the ‘more’ is inoperative subject mat-
ter.”191  Nonetheless, the commentator conceded that a claim 
including inoperative-embodiments might properly be held 
invalid “where most of the embodiments are inoperative, or 
where it is impossible or very difficult for one skilled in the 
art to determine whether a material is operative.”192 
In a span of two years, the C.C.P.A. decided four logi-
 
188. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[I]t is incumbent 
upon the Patent Office, whenever a rejection on this basis [scope of enablement 
commensurate with scope of protection sought] is made, to explain why it doubts 
the truth or accuracy of any statement in a supporting disclosure. . . .”); accord 
Bowen, 492 F.2d at 862 (“It is clear that even in cases involving the unpredictable 
world of chemistry such reasons are required.”); Ex parte Gastambide, 189 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643, 645 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1975) (“Proper grounds for rejec-
tion require more than unsubstantiated doubt as to the operability of the inven-
tion.”); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PRECEDENT 
GOVERNING THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT ¶ II.C (1995) [hereinafter PTO LEGAL 
OVERVIEW:  UTILITY]). 
189. See generally Einhorn, supra note 186. 
190. See generally id. 
191. Goodman, supra note 185, at 749. 
192. Id; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 
271, 276-77 (1949) (holding that claims may be too broad “to the point of invalid-
ity” by reason of reading on significant numbers of inoperative embodiments). 
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cally-connected cases that together confirm that neither the 
potential nor the actual existence of inoperative embodi-
ments necessarily defeats a claim:193  (1) In re Skrivan,194 (2) In 
re Cook,195 (3) In re Marzocchi,196 and (4) In re Fouche.197 
In the first decision, In re Skrivan, the C.C.P.A. addressed 
constructively inoperative embodiments.  The applicant had 
claimed certain improvements in the “plasma-jet” process 
for making finely-divided metal oxides for use in pig-
ments.198  The PTO had rejected several of the claims under 
section 112 as being “unduly broad” in failing to include a 
limitation alleged to be necessary to operation of the proc-
ess.199  The examiner’s undue breadth rejection was predi-
cated on the applicant’s failure to recite within the claim the 
angle at which the two reactant-containing streams were 
combined.200  The Skrivan court observed that neither were 
the claims indefinite, nor had the applicant suggested that 
the claims defined anything other than what the applicant 
regarded as his invention.201  Moreover, the Skrivan court 
 
193. See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  In Cook, the court ob-
served: 
While we have held that ‘the mere possibility of inclusion of inopera-
tive . . . [subject matter] does not prevent allowance of broad claims,’ 
when the examiner sets forth reasonable grounds in support of his con-
clusion that an applicant’s claims may read on inoperative subject mat-
ter (other than subject matter inoperative only in the sense of In re 
Skrivan) . . . it becomes incumbent upon the applicant either to reasona-
bly limit his claims to the approximate area where operativeness has 
not been challenged or to rebut the examiner’s challenge either by the 
submission of representative evidence, or by persuasive arguments 
based on known laws of physics and chemistry . . . . 
439 F.2d at 734-35 n.4 (citations omitted); see also In re Barr, 444 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 
1971); In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220 
(C.C.P.A. 1971); see generally Gholz, supra note 184. 
194. 427 F.2d 801 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
195. 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
196. 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
197. 439 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
198. Skrivan, 427 F.2d at 802. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 805. 
201. Id. at 805-06. 
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emphasized that the disputed limitation dealt with a routine 
operating condition of an admittedly old aspect of the proc-
ess.202  Such limitations, the court held, must be presumed to 
be within the level of ordinary skill in the relevant art.203 
In short, the Skrivan court held that claims that might be 
construed as including inoperative embodiments are not 
necessarily unpatentable.204  If it would have been obvious to 
one skilled in the relevant art that the embodiments other-
wise allowed by the claim would be inoperable, one skilled 
in the art would not resort to such embodiments, and the 
presence of such embodiments should not preclude allow-
ability of the claim.205 
Similarly, the C.C.P.A. has held that where such an am-
biguity is not central to the invention, there is likewise little 
risk of encroachment on the public interest, and the claims 
may be allowed.206 
The C.C.P.A. elaborated on Skrivan in In re Cook.  The 
claims in Cook, directed to zoom lens assemblies, stood re-
jected under the first paragraph of section 112.  Among other 
things, the claims were supported by six exemplary em-
bodiments.  The Cook court acknowledged that the optical 
design of such lens assemblies is extremely complex, involv-
ing the manipulation of more than 100 related variables.207  
The Cook court acknowledged that the PTO may reject claims 
merely because they read on “one or more inoperative spe-
cies,”208 but noted that many properly patented claims do 
 
202. Id. at 806. 
203. Skrivan, 427 F.2d at 806 (“We hold that claims need not recite such fac-
tors where one of ordinary skill in the art, to whom the specification and claims 
are directed, would consider them obvious.”). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. See, e.g., In re Stephens, 529 F.2d 1343, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“Noncriti-
cal features of the invention may be supported by a more general disclosure than 
those at the heart of the invention.”). 
207. Cook, 439 F.2d at 731. 
208. Id. at 734 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 
U.S. 271, 276-77 (1949)). 
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not exclude inoperative embodiments, because one skilled in 
the relevant art might reasonably be presumed to appreciate 
those factors that would lead to inoperative embodiments.209 
Notwithstanding its recognition that inoperative em-
bodiments do not necessarily preclude patentability of 
claims, the court affirmed the PTO’s rejection of Cook’s 
claims.210  The court characterized the examiner’s rejection 
for insufficient disclosure under section 112 as twofold:  (1) 
because it would take one skilled in the art many months to 
 
209. In Cook, the court explained: 
We see no reason why the Patent Office and the courts deciding in-
fringement litigation should not ‘have authority to reject a broad claim 
merely because it . . . [reads on a significant number of] inoperative spe-
cies.’ 
However, many patented claims read on vast numbers of inopera-
tive embodiments in the trivial sense that they can and do omit ‘factors 
which must be presumed to be within the level of ordinary skill in the 
art,’ and therefore read on embodiments in which such factors may be 
included in such a manner as to make the embodiments inoperative.  
There is nothing wrong with this so long as it would be obvious to one 
of skill in the relevant art how to include those factors in such manner 
as to make the embodiment operative rather than inoperative. 
Id. at 734-35 (alternation in original) (citations omitted); accord In re Geerdes, 491 
F.2d 1260, 1265 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“Of course, it is possible to argue that process 
claims encompass inoperative embodiments on the premise of unrealistic or 
vague assumptions, but that is not a valid basis for rejection.”); In re Smythe, 480 
F.2d 1376 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In Smythe, the court noted that: 
The use here of any particular ‘liquids’ which would be inoperative, 
such as the examples given by the board—‘colored materials,’ materials 
‘adherent to the walls of the sight tube,’ and ‘liquid wetting agents’—
would be predictably inoperative in the invention and thus would 
never be selected by one skilled in the art.  As we have said before, it is 
almost always possible to so construe a claim as to have it read on inop-
erative embodiments, but the alternative of requiring an applicant to be 
so specific in his claims “as to exclude materials known to be inopera-
tive and [which] even those not skilled in the art would not try” would 
result in claims which would fail to comply with [section] 112, second 
paragraph, because they would be so detailed as to obscure, rather than 
to particularly point out and distinctly claim, the invention. 
480 F.2d at 1385 (citations omitted); see also Ex parte Vollheim, 191 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 407, 408 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1975) (“It is not a function of the claims to 
specifically exclude either possible inoperative conditions or ineffective reactant 
proportions.”). 
210. Cook, 439 F.2d at 736 (holding that the PTO had properly rejected the 
claims). 
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design other lenses that came within the claim, and (2) be-
cause the six examples were not representative of the ranges 
recited in the claims.211  Under the examiner’s first rationale, 
the Cook court found for the applicants.212  Although the ap-
plicants conceded that the claims encompassed a large num-
ber of inoperative embodiments, the court found that a per-
son skilled in the relevant art could determine a priori, albeit 
through lengthy calculations, which embodiments would be 
inoperative.213 
Under the examiner’s second rationale, however, the 
Cook court ruled against the applicants.214  The court held 
that the applicants had represented, at least implicitly 
through their application, that operative embodiments re-
sided throughout the claimed ranges, but that the corre-
sponding ranges found in the examples were not coextensive 
with the claimed ranges.215  The court found that, when chal-
lenged on this point by the PTO, the applicants failed to pro-
vide evidence supporting the recited ranges,216 and accord-
ingly affirmed the examiner’s rejection.217 
The court held that although one skilled in the relevant 
art would have known a priori that certain embodiments 
within the claimed ranges of variables would be inoperative, 
the applicants failed to show that embodiments could be 
made throughout the claimed ranges that would be opera-
tive.218  The court further held that the conceded existence of 
 
211. Id. at 732. 
212. Id. at 732-33. 
213. Id. at 735; see also Tyler v. City of Boston, 74 U.S. 327, 330 (1868) (observ-
ing that the effects of a machine consisting of a combination of devices and sub-
ject of invention, may be calculated a priori, while discovery of a new substance 
by means of chemical combinations of known materials is empirical and discov-
ered by experiment). 
214. Cook, 439 F.2d at 735-36. 
215. Id. 
216. Id.  Finally, on appeal, the applicants made the unsupported statement 
that they had performed calculations supporting the ranges.  Id. at 736. 
217. Id. 
218. Cook, 439 F.2d at 736. 
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inoperative embodiments—which the PTO and the court 
treated as analogous to unpredictability—supported the ex-
aminer’s challenge, and shifted the burden of proof to the 
applicants to establish the existence of operative embodi-
ments throughout the ranges claimed.219 
In In re Marzocchi, the C.C.P.A. further refined the proper 
allocation of the burden of proof, particularly in the context 
of a chemical case.  In Marzocchi, the applicants had claimed 
a technique for improving the adhesion characteristics be-
tween glass fibers and vinyl polymer resins by premixing a 
specified “amine compound” with the polymer resin.220  
Claims six and twelve, which specified “polyethyleneamine” 
as the amine compound, were rejected under the first para-
graph of section 112 as not enabled by the specification.221  
The PTO noted that “[t]he term is obviously generic to a con-
siderable number of compounds.”222  The Marzocchi court 
reversed the rejection, explaining that the PTO had ex-
pressed nothing more than concern over the breadth of the 
disputed term.223  The court held that if the specification 
supports the claim, and there is no reason to doubt the sup-
porting statements made in the specification, the disclosure 
must be taken as enabling;224 that is, where the specification 
supports the scope of the claim ab initio, it is incumbent upon 
the PTO to disprove or explain why it doubts the truth or ac-
curacy of the supporting statements in the specification.225 
 
219. See id. (noting that “[a]ppellants asserted that they had ‘made calcula-
tions which resulted in the definition of the ranges set forth in the specification,’ 
but they never produced those calculations to substantiate the truthfulness of the 
teaching in their specification which the examiner challenged.”). 
220. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 221. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 223. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223-24.  The Marzocchi court noted that: 
In the field of chemistry generally, there may be times when the well-
known unpredictability of chemical reactions will alone be enough to 
create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad state-
ment put forward as enabling support for a claim.  This will especially 
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The applicants in Marzocchi had complied with the writ-
ten description requirement by expressly contemplating a 
certain breadth of the invention, constraining the PTO to put 
forth credible reasons to rebut such statements.226  Because 
the PTO had merely expressed doubt about enablement due 
to the apparent breadth of the term, it failed to meet its bur-
den, and the court reversed the rejection.227 
                                                                                                                                  
be the case where the statement is, on its face, contrary to generally ac-
cepted scientific principles.  Most often, additional factors, such as the 
teachings in pertinent references, will be available to substantiate any 
doubts that the asserted scope of objective enablement is in fact com-
mensurate with the scope of protection sought and to support any de-
mands based thereon for proof.  In any event, it is incumbent upon the 
Patent Office, whenever a rejection on this basis is made, to explain why 
it doubts the truth or accuracy of any statement in a supporting disclo-
sure and to back up assertions of its own with acceptable evidence or 
reasoning which is inconsistent with the contested statement. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Ex parte Hitzeman, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1821, 1822 
(Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988).  According to the Hitzeman court:  “[w]e are mindful 
that it is incumbent on the PTO, whenever a rejection on this basis is made, to 
advance acceptable reasoning or evidence which is inconsistent with enable-
ment.  That is, it is incumbent on the examiner to first establish a prima facie case 
of nonenablement.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
226. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224. 
227. Id.; see also In re Barr, 444 F.2d 588, 589-90 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  In Barr, the 
examiner had rejected claims incorporating the terms “5-pyrazolone coupler 
radical” and “open-chain ketomethylene coupler radical,” among others.  Id.  The 
applicants had filed a lengthy specification including working examples for 25 
different 5-pyrazolone coupler radicals.  Id. at 595.  Consistent with usage in the 
claims, the applicants had used the terms generically within the specification, 
and thus complied with the written description requirement.  Id. 
The court faulted both the Board and the examiner for failing to identify par-
ticular deficiencies whereby the working examples were inadequate to support 
the claimed genus.  Id. at 596.  The court noted that the PTO proffered no evi-
dence of inoperative compounds within the scope of the claims, nor was there 
any evidence suggesting that “any significant group of compounds embraced by 
the claims are so obviously inoperative that we can take judicial notice of the 
fact.”  Barr, 444 F.2d at 589-90.  In reversing, the Barr court said: 
Appellants have specifically disclosed how to make and use a large 
number of compounds and have asserted that other compounds, similar 
to the compounds specifically disclosed in certain stated respects, may 
be made and used in the same fashion.  We see no reason, on the state 
of this record, to suspect that their assertion is not accurate or that ap-
pellants are not the pioneer inventors they claim to be.  Appellants’ ap-
plication runs to 132 pages in the transcript of record, and we are not 
persuaded that any useful purpose would have been served by extend-
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In In re Fouche, however, the PTO met its burden.  The 
applicant had presented claims directed to dibenzocyclohep-
tadiene derivatives said to be useful for antidepressant, neu-
roleptic, and tranquilizing properties.228  The PTO rejected a 
generic claim incorporating a Markush group,229 which ex-
pressly included both aliphatic and heterocyclic230 substitu-
ents, under the first paragraph of section 112 for insuffi-
ciency of disclosure.231  In rejecting the claim, the examiner 
urged that the specification did not enable the use of com-
pounds having heterocyclic moieties.232  The examiner noted 
that none of the working examples included heterocyclic 
moieties, and concluded that one of skill in the relevant art 
would not expect such embodiments to be operative.233 
The court acknowledged that the specification was de-
void of examples incorporating heterocyclic moieties, and 
that the applicant failed to provide other evidence support-
ing the utility of such compounds.234  Furthermore, the court 
                                                                                                                                  
ing it with further working examples. 
Id. at 596-97. 
228. Id. at 1238. 
229. A Markush group is a “contrived generic expression where no true ge-
neric expression exists.  Example:  a metal selected from the group consisting of 
copper, silver, and gold.”  LANDIS, supra note 52, at 528; see also Edward C. Wal-
terscheid, Markush Practice Revisited, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 270 (1979). 
230. Aliphatic refers to organic compounds characterized by straight or 
branched chain arrangement of the constituent carbon atoms; heterocyclic refers 
to closed ring chemical substituents having a hetero atom, such as nitrogen or 
oxygen, integral to the closed ring.  See N. IRVING SAX AND RICHARD J. LEWIS, SR., 
HAWLEY’S CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICTIONARY (11th ed. 1987).  Here, the terms are 
used to describe substituents attached to the molecular skeleton of the core 
pharmacological compound. 
231. Fouche, 439 F.2d at 1243. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Id.  The court stated that: 
[T]he inclusion of representative examples is not required to 
enable a person skilled in the art to use a generic invention.  
Nevertheless, an applicant must use some technique of provid-
ing teaching of how to use which is commensurate with the 
breadth of protection sought by the claim, unless such knowl-
edge is already available to persons skilled in the art. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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relied on the fact that the PTO had cited a reference that 
called into question the utility of the claimed compounds 
when bearing heterocyclic substituents.235  The court said 
that reference was sufficient to shift the burden to the appel-
lant, and thus affirmed the rejection.236 
C. Undue Experimentation 
The modern enablement inquiry has supplanted the un-
due breadth and inoperative embodiments rejections.237  The 
PTO and judicial opinions now focus on whether one skilled 
in the art would expect that undue experimentation would 
be required to practice the invention throughout its scope; in 
other words, whether the scope of enablement is commensu-
rate in scope with the claim.238  The development of this in-
quiry was a significant step in the evolution of the suffi-
ciency of disclosure analysis as applied to the unpredictable 
arts.239  This section traces that development. 
The evolution of the undue experimentation analysis be-
gan in 1970, when the C.C.P.A. contemporaneously found 
fatal ambiguities in challenges based upon both undue 
 
235. Fouche, 439 F.2d at 1243. 
236. Id. 
237. See supra parts II.A.1, II.B.2.b.  As discussed above, the continued vi-
ability of the “undue breadth” rejection is questionable.  See supra note 114 and 
accompanying text.  But cf. CHISUM, supra note 6, § 7.03[7] (discussing undue 
breadth generally).  Professor Chisum refers to the “three senses of undue 
breadth,” one of which is a claim encompassing material from the prior art.  Id.  
The source of such a rejection is novelty (section 102) and/or obviousness (sec-
tion 103).  Id.  Consistent with the theme of this Article, use of “undue breadth” 
does not include that aspect. 
238. See In re Angstadt, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that 
the PTO bears the initial burden of establishing why a specification is not ena-
bling, and that alleged insufficiencies of disclosure necessitate undue experimen-
tation).  One commentator has suggested that there is a dichotomy between the 
inquiries as to whether undue experimentation would be required or whether 
the scope of enablement is commensurate with the scope of the claims.  Walter-
scheid (pt. V), supra note 14.  The inquiries suggest different tests requiring dif-
ferent evidence, and, presumably, capable of yielding different results.  This Ar-
ticle treats the inquiries as stated in the text above as coterminous. 
239. See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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breadth and inoperative embodiments.240  Although both 
terms subsequently faded from use,  the underlying issue—
how to test the scope of enablement against the scope of pro-
tection sought—remains.241 
The evolution that occurred during that era is seen in ret-
rospect in In re Sichert.242  Sichert sounded the death knell for 
challenges based upon inoperative embodiments,243 and con-
firmed the arrival of the modern inquiry.244 
 
240. See, e.g., In re Barr, 422 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (undue breadth and in-
operative embodiments); In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (inoperative 
embodiments); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (concerning undue 
breadth); see also In re Mayhew, 527 F.2d 1229, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Baldwin, J., 
concurring): 
Beginning in 1970, we departed from a vast line of authority which 
permitted the PTO to reject claims under the second paragraph of [sec-
tion] 112 for ‘undue breadth.’ Up to that time, examiners quite fre-
quently determined what they felt the invention was and rejected all 
claims which were broader than their conception of the invention, using 
the second paragraph of [section] 112 as the statutory basis.  Most often, 
the examiner’s conception of the invention was derived from a reading 
of an applicant’s specification. 
Id. 
241. See e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
242. 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
243. Having seemingly disposed of inoperative embodiments as a valid ba-
sis for rejection, In re Sichert was the last C.C.P.A. opinion to substantively ad-
dress the issue in those terms.  But cf. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 497 F. Supp. 
661, 682 (D. Del. 1980) (“The third description rule prevents an applicant’s claim 
from covering inoperative as well as operative subject matter.”) (citing Graver 
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949)).  The M.P.E.P. 
continues to address the inoperative embodiments rejection.  M.P.E.P., supra note 
16, § 2164.08(b).  Nonetheless, the PTO acknowledges that the rejection is often 
obviated by functional language limiting the claim to operative embodiments. 
244. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161.  In Sichert, the court said: 
[The rejection] establishes a prima facie case of lack of enablement, a  
result that would not follow from a showing or allegation of the mere 
possibility of inclusion of inoperative embodiments in broad claims.  
Therefore, the burden shifted to appellant to show that one of ordinary 
skill in the art could practice the invention without undue experimenta-
tion. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Thus, the Sichert court explicitly dis-
counted the significance of inoperative embodiments within the ambit of the 
claim in favor of an examination as to whether undue experimentation would be 
required. 
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The term undue experimentation is not new to the suffi-
ciency of disclosure analysis.245  For example, in Buckeye In-
cubator Co. v. Wolf,246 the court addressed alleged infringe-
ment of patents pertaining to egg hatching.247  The defendant 
urged that the method claims were void for indefiniteness.248  
According to the alleged infringer, important features, such 
as the temperature, humidity, and velocity of air current 
within certain egg incubators, were not recited within the 
specification.249  The alleged infringer further argued that the 
absence of such features in the patent’s disclosure thereby 
created a patent that was erroneous and misleading.250  The 
Buckeye court observed, however, that despite the discovery 
of certain defects in a commercialized prototype incubator, 
various field experts sent out by the incubator company had 
been able to remedy those defects.251  The court thus denied 
the proposition that the patent was fatally flawed for omit-
ting from the disclosure something known to be necessary to 
the practice of the invention.252 
Buckeye presaged the modern inquiry.  Its reasoning and, 
particularly, its use of the term undue (as opposed to other 
modifiers) placed an emphasis on the qualitative aspect of 
 
245. See generally Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Wolf, 291 F. 253 (N.D. Ohio 
1923). 
246. 291 F. at 253. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 261.  At the time Buckeye was decided, the controlling law was the 
Patent Act of 1870, Section 26 [R.S. § 4888].  That section corresponded to current 
section 112, but it combined in a single paragraph the disclosure requirements of 
the first paragraph of section 112 with the claim requirements of the second 
paragraph of section 112.  Understandably, the court treats indefiniteness inter-
changeably with the requirements of disclosure. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Buckeye, 291 F. at 261. 
252. Id.  The court rejected the proposition that the patentee had omitted 
from his disclosures something that was known to be necessary to the practical 
operation of his method claims.  Id.  In actual experience, persons skilled in the 
art have not found these disclosures so indefinite and defective as to make the 
apparatus inoperative without undue experimentation.  Id. 
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the experimentation required.253  Others had suggested that 
the need for merely independent or extensive experimentation 
should nullify patentability.254  Subsequent decisions have 
acknowledged the propriety of that qualitative emphasis.255 
In 1961, the term undue experimentation was resur-
rected.256  In Locklin v. Switzer Bros.,257 the patent in issue was 
directed to resins useful in the manufacture of pigments.258  
The resin ingredients were said to include an aldehyde, a 
melamine, and a sulfonamide.259  The accused infringer chal-
lenged the sufficiency of the disclosure as inadequate to 
support a claim for a broad class of melamine derivatives.260  
Specifically, the alleged infringer claimed that “there is no 
recipe given for the proportions of the entire class of mela-
mine compounds by which one could be certain to obtain 
the critical result.”261  Nonetheless, the court acknowledged 
testimony that such a determination involved “a simple, 
clear test for an ordinary chemist to perform and one that 
does not require extensive experimentation in order that the 
precise critical limits be ascertained in a particular case.”262  
 
253. Id. at 261-62. 
254. See, e.g., Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 
465, 474 (1895) (“If the description be so vague and uncertain that no one can tell, 
except by independent experiments, how to construct the patented device, the 
patent is void.”); Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. 1 (1847) (suggesting that any ex-
perimentation nullifies the patent). 
255. Cf. In re Angstadt, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 219 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The 
key word is ‘undue’ not ‘experimentation.’”). 
256. Locklin v. Switzer Bros., 299 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1961). 
257. 299 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1961). 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 162. 
260. Id. at 167. 
261. Id. 
262. Locklin, 299 F.2d at 166.  Similarly, in Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 
the Court said: 
Equally untenable is the claim that the patent is invalid for the reason 
that the evidence shows that when different ores are treated prelimi-
nary tests mus[t] be made to determine the amount of oil and the extent 
of agitation necessary in order to obtain the best results.  Such variation 
of treatment must be within the scope of the claims, and the certainty 
which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, hav-
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Thus, the court held that ascertaining such specific limits in 
any particular case did not require extensive or undue ex-
perimentation.263 
Subsequently, undue experimentation was invoked with 
increasing frequency.  Nonetheless, it was not until 1970 that 
it rose to the level of a structured analytical tool.264 
                                                                                                                                  
ing regard to their subject matter.  The composition of ores varies infi-
nitely, each one presenting its special problem, and it is obviously im-
possible to specify in a patent the precise treatment which would be 
most successful and economical in each case.  The process is one for 
dealing with a large class of substances and the range of treatment 
within the terms of the claims, while leaving something to the skill of 
persons applying the invention, is clearly sufficiently definite to guide 
those skilled in the art to its successful application, as the evidence 
abundantly shows.  This satisfies the law. 
242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916) (citations omitted). 
263. Locklin, 299 F.2d at 168. 
264. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (identifying the direct 
relationship between unpredictability and noting the likelihood that undue ex-
perimentation will be required).  Previously, opinions had merely reiterated the 
term “undue experimentation” from PTO rejections without explaining how such 
a conclusion is properly made.  See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Chase Chem. Co., 
155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 139, 145 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“It is, of course, well settled, that a 
patent is invalid for insufficient disclosure if, in order to practice the invention, a 
person skilled in the art must resort to elaborate experimentation, independent 
investigation, or exercise inventive skill.”) (citations omitted); In re Long, 368 
F.2d 892, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“We are of the view that the minimum amount of 
disilicide required to bind the oxide particles together can be determined by a 
skilled metallurgist without an undue amount of experimentation.”); In re 
Moureu, 345 F.2d 595, 597 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“Appellants have not placed one iota 
of evidence in the record to indicate that one skilled in the art would be able to 
use their antitubercular compounds effectively without undue experimenta-
tion . . . [leaving us] no way of knowing whether an express ‘how to use’ disclo-
sure is necessary.”); In re Corneil, 347 F.2d 557, 561 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“[Although 
we] do not hold that actual performance of appellants’ method would necessar-
ily be a prerequisite to patentability . . . the fact that the method has not been per-
formed compels recognition that other problems not yet uncovered may exist in 
addition to those discussed.”); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“From 
the disclosure of appellant’s invention as it appears in the specification alone, we 
feel that one skilled in the art would be enabled to make and use appellant’s in-
vention without undue experimentation . . . .”); see also PTO DRUG UTILITY 
GUIDELINES, supra note 124, at 568 (“It is not necessary to specify the dosage or 
method of use if it is obvious to one skilled in the art that such information could 
be obtained without undue experimentation.”) (emphasis added). 
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In In re Fisher,265 the PTO Board of Appeals had rejected 
for insufficient disclosure Fisher’s claims directed to adreno-
corticotrophic hormones (“ACTH”) having “at least twenty-
four amino acids” of a specified sequence.266  Fisher had dis-
closed only certain ACTHs having thirty-nine amino ac-
ids.267  The court concluded that this was insufficient to en-
able one skilled in the relevant art to make ACTHs of 
anything other than thirty-nine amino acids; consequently, 
the applicant had not enabled one of skill in the art to make 
ACTHs of “at least twenty-four amino acids.”268 
In re Angstadt269 illustrates the further transformation of 
the enablement inquiry from its focus on inoperative em-
bodiments to undue experimentation.  In Angstadt, the 
claimed invention involved a method of catalytically con-
verting hydrocarbons to hydroperoxides.270  In example six 
of the disclosure, however, the applicants stated that they 
had recovered from that reaction mixture an aldehyde rather 
than a hydroperoxide.271  The PTO rejected the correspond-
ing claim based upon inoperative examples.272  The appellate 
court reversed,273 acknowledging that “many chemical proc-
esses, and catalytic processes particularly, are unpredictable, 
 
265. 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
266. Id. at 838-39. 
267. Id. at 839. 
268. Id. at 836.  In Fisher, the court said: 
[T]he parent specification does not enable one skilled in the art to make 
or obtain ACTHs with other than 39 amino acids in the chain, and there 
has been no showing that one of ordinary skill would have known how 
to make or obtain such other ACTH’s without undue experimentation.  
As for appellant’s conclusion that the 25th to 39th acids in the chain are 
unnecessary, it is one thing to make such a statement when persons 
skilled in the art are able to make or obtain ACTH having other than 39 
amino acids; it is quite another thing when they are not able to do so. 
Id. 
269. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1960). 
270. Id. at 499.  For definitions of chemical terminology, see SAX AND LEWIS, 
supra note 74. 
271. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 501. 
272. Id. at 500-01. 
273. Id. at 505. 
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and that the scope of enablement varies inversely with the 
degree of unpredictability involved.”274  Nonetheless, in this 
case, the applicants’ process is “not complicated and there is 
no indication that special equipment or unusual reaction 
conditions must be provided when practicing the inven-
tion.”275  The applicants had shown that the same metal salt 
catalyst used in example six was operative, albeit with other 
starting materials.276  The Angstadt court observed that it was 
common in the use of catalysts to perform trial runs, even if 
the end result was uncertain.277  The court noted that the 
burden was on the PTO to give reasons why the specifica-
tion is not enabling, and that a showing that the alleged in-
sufficiencies of the disclosure necessitate undue experimenta-
tion is part of the PTO’s initial burden.278  Other than the 
applicants’ failure to successfully identify hydroperoxides in 
the product of example six, the PTO had failed to explain 
why it doubted the truth or accuracy of the supporting dis-
closure.279 
Angstadt is analogous to the court’s treatment of the 
PTO’s rejection in Cook.  In Cook, the court observed that it 
would have been possible for one of skill in the relevant art 
to determine, a priori, which variables would lead to inopera-
tive embodiments, albeit through complex and lengthy cal-
culations.280  Similarly, in Angstadt, the court concluded that 
it would have been routine to conduct trial runs to deter-
mine which of the catalyst/starting material combinations 
would be operative.281  That is, although the determination 
 
274. Id. at 502 (citations omitted). 
275. Id. at 503. 
276. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504-05. 
277. Id. at 504 (noting that some experimentation is acceptable and that the 
term “experimentation” implies that the success of the activity is uncertain). 
278. Id. 
279. Id. (citing In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1975)); see also In re 
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
280. Cook, 439 F.2d at 730. 
281. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 505 (“In this art the performing of trial runs using 
different catalysts is ‘reasonable,’ even if the end result is uncertain . . . .”). 
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could not be made, a priori, such routine trial runs were no 
more burdensome than complex and lengthy calculations as 
required in Cook.282  Accordingly, the Angstadt court reversed 
the PTO’s rejection.283 
1. Undue Experimentation and its Subsidiary 
Factors 
Just months before Sichert, the C.C.P.A. decided In re 
Colianni,284 in which Judge Miller’s concurring opinion ex-
pressed collectively the various factors to be included in an 
undue experimentation inquiry where unpredictable factors 
pertain.285  Judge Miller suggested that one should consider:  
(1) whether the applicant has provided sufficient direction or 
guidance for any experimentation, and (2) the presence or 
absence of working examples, (3) the nature of the invention, 
(4) the state of the prior art, (5) the relative skill of those in 
the art, (6) the unpredictability of the art, and (7) the breadth 
of the claims.286  The Federal Circuit, the C.C.P.A., and the 
 
282. Cf. Tyler v. City of Boston, 74 U.S. 327, 330 (1868). 
283. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 505. 
284. 561 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
285. Id. at 224 (Miller, J., concurring). 
286. Id.  Judge Miller wrote: 
In determining what constitutes undue experimentation, many factors 
are to be taken into account.  The quality of any necessary experimenta-
tion would clearly be undue when ‘ingenuity beyond that to be ex-
pected of one of ordinary skill in the art’ is required.  Judge Rich’s opin-
ion indicates that the quantity of necessary experimentation (i.e., ‘a 
great amount of work’) may be undue.  However, an extended period 
of experimentation may not be undue if the skilled artisan is given suf-
ficient direction or guidance.  Other factors to be considered are the 
presence or absence of working examples, the nature of the invention, 
the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art, the predict-
ability or unpredictability of the art, and the breadth of the claims. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The qualitative aspect of any necessary experimentation 
had been acknowledged earlier.  See Matheson v. Campbell, 78 F. 910 (2d Cir. 
1897).  In Matheson, the court found insufficient disclosure in support of claims 
generically covering the diazotization of sulpho acids derived from coal tar to 
create aniline colors, notably naphthol-black.  Id. at 916.  The applicants conceded 
that there were as many as 500 such sulpho acids and that a great many of these 
would not work in the prescribed process.  Id.  The court concluded that “[s]ome 
future experimenter will have to make some new discovery, and invent some 
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PTO have embraced Judge Miller’s factors (and others) 
when analyzing sufficiency of disclosure in disciplines per-
ceived to be possessed of unpredictability.287 
Ironically, Judge Miller had dissented in Angstadt, yet in 
Colianni he provides an artfully crafted statement that brings 
Angstadt in line with Cook.  The majority in Angstadt held 
that the performance of trial runs was commonplace and 
thus reasonable.288  Angstadt is thus an extension of Cook in 
that the majority was not dissuaded by the fact that one of 
ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had to perform 
trial runs of the claimed process to determine operability.   
One can see from the court’s reasoning that it concluded that 
such trial runs did not require “ingenuity beyond that to be 
expected of one of ordinary skill in the art.”289 
The determination of what constitutes undue experimen-
tation must be decided on the facts of each particular case; 
such a determination also “requires the application of a 
                                                                                                                                  
new process, before these other sulpho acids can be transformed into naphthol-
black.”  Id. 
287. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (identifying fac-
tors to be considered in the undue experimentation inquiry as:  (1) the quantity 
of experimentation necessarily; (2) the amount of direction or guidance pre-
sented; (3) the presence or absence of working examples; (4) the nature of the in-
vention; (5) the state of the prior art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7) 
the predictability or unpredictability of the art; and (8) the breadth of the claims); 
Ex parte Kung, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1547 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990) (identi-
fying as undue experimentation factors:  (1) the breadth of the claims; (2) the na-
ture of the invention; (3) the amount of direction or guidance presented; (4)  the 
presence or absence of working examples; and (5) the unpredictability of the art); 
Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 547 (Bd. Pat. App & Int. 1986); see also 
In re Stephens, 529 F.2d 1343, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1976).  In Stephens, the court noted: 
The test is whether there is sufficient working procedure for one skilled 
in the art to practice the claimed invention without undue experimenta-
tion.  In addition to the presence or absence of a working example, rele-
vant considerations are the nature of the invention, the state of the prior 
art, and the relative skill of those in that art. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
288. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504. 
289. 537 F.2d 503; see also Minerals Separation v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916); 
Buckeye Incubator, Inc. v. Wolf, 291 F. 253 (N.D. Ohio 1923); In re Gay 309 F.2d 
769 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
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standard of reasonableness, having due regard for the nature 
of the invention and the state of the art.”290  It is well estab-
lished that a patent specification need not be a blueprint for 
practicing the invention.291  Accordingly, “enablement is not 
precluded even if some experimentation is necessary, al-
though the amount of experimentation must not be unduly 
extensive.”292 
Thus, some level of experimentation is to be tolerated, al-
though apparently not so much that it rises to inventive ex-
perimentation, or that requiring ingenuity beyond one of or-
dinary skill in the relevant art.  Experimentation requiring 
only routine optimization or screening is not inventive ex-
perimentation.293 
2. Supporting the Generic Claim 
As previously noted, the genus-species dichotomy has 
been problematic for inventors, the PTO, and the courts, par-
ticularly when addressing inventions in disciplines per-
 
290. Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986). 
291. See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (not-
ing that patent specifications need not be as detailed as production specifica-
tions). 
292. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987). 
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has explained that: 
The test is not merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of ex-
perimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine, or if the specifica-
tion in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect 
to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed to enable 
the determination of how to practice a desired embodiment of the in-
vention claimed. 
Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. at 547. 
293. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Enablement is 
not precluded by the necessity for some experimentation such as routine screen-
ing.”) (citations omitted); Locklin, 299 F.2d at 166.  The Locklin court stated: 
There is testimony to the effect that ‘sufficient melamine to render the 
resin substantially insoluble’ is a simple, clear test for an ordinary 
chemist to perform and one which does not require extensive experi-
mentation in order that the precise critical limits be ascertained in a par-
ticular case.  Under such circumstances, the fact that some preliminary 
testing is required does not render the claim invalid for vagueness. 
Id. (citing Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916)). 
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ceived to be unpredictable.294  This sub-section focuses on 
several cases illustrating failed attempts to support genus 
claims with discrete species claims. 
In Ex parte Diamond,295 the PTO Board of Appeals had 
specifically held that an applicant shall not secure exclusive 
rights to a broad generic invention on the basis of broad un-
supported statements.296 
In 1968, the Commissioner of Patents issued Guidelines 
for Considering Disclosure of Utility in Drug Cases (“Guide-
lines”).297  With regard to establishing utility of genus claims, 
the Guidelines clarified the rule from Ex parte Diamond, ex-
plaining that unsupported generalizations must be taken at 
face value, unless there is some basis for doubting them.298 
In Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,299 the court addressed the 
sufficiency of disclosure of broad genus claims, and ac-
knowledged the principle that the specification must sup-
port the utility of claimed compounds throughout the scope 
 
294. See supra notes 55-90 (discussing application of the disclosure require-
ment to the unpredictable arts). 
295. 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 167 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1959). 
296. In Diamond, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences said: 
An applicant may not preempt an unduly large field by the expedient of 
making broad prophetic statements in the specification and claims 
unless the accuracy of such statements is sufficiently supported by well 
established chemical principles or by sufficient number of examples. 
Id. at 168. 
297. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR CONSIDERING 
DISCLOSURES OF UTILITY IN DRUG CASES (1968). 
298. The Guidelines stated that: 
[R]epresentative examples together with a statement applicable to the 
genus as a whole will ordinarily be sufficient if it would be deemed 
likely by one skilled in the art, in view of contemporary knowledge in 
the art, that the claimed genus would possess the asserted utility.  Proof 
of utility will be required for other members of the claimed genus only 
in those cases where adequate reasons can be advanced by the examiner 
for believing that the genus as a whole does not possess the asserted 
utility. 
PTO DRUG UTILITY GUIDELINES, supra note 124, at 568; see also M.P.E.P., supra note 
16, § 2107.02. 
299. 497 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del. 1980). 
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of the claim.300  In what the court loosely characterized as an 
exception to this rule, it observed that only a few examples 
will suffice where the claimed compounds share a “key 
structural feature from which a common utility derives.”301 
 
300. Id. at 681-82. 
301. Id. at 682.  The court suggests that there is an exception to the so-called 
chemical exception, which brings the court’s reasoning back in line with the gen-
eral rule.  Id.  The chemical exception states that, due to unpredictability, generic 
claims involving chemical reactions can not be supported by a limited number of 
examples.  M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.03.  Nonetheless, as among more pre-
dictable inventions, as where claimed compounds share key features having an 
acknowledged common utility, the general rule should prevail—that is, a limited 
number of examples can support broad generic claims.  Here, the court found 
that there was an acknowledged common utility, and so the unpredictability giv-
ing rise to the chemical exception did not pertain.  Hercules, 497 F. Supp. at 682. 
Further, one might interpret the court’s reasoning to suggest some quantifi-
able relationship between the number of examples and the requisite support for 
a genus claim from which an exception might be made.  The courts have rou-
tinely spurned the proposition that there is any such relationship to be divined.  
See In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357, 
360 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“The decisions do not however fix any definite number of 
species which will establish completion of a generic invention and it seems evi-
dent therefrom that such number will vary, depending on the circumstances of 
particular cases.”).  In Strahilevitz, the court observed: 
We recognize that working examples are desirable in complex technolo-
gies and that detailed examples can satisfy the statutory enablement re-
quirement . . . . Nevertheless, as acknowledged by the board, examples 
are not required to satisfy section 112, first paragraph.  Therefore the ex-
aminer’s statement that the ‘nearly universal applicability’ alleged for 
the invention necessitated numerous examples was erroneous. 
Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d at 1232 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also In re 
Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 696 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (rejecting the board’s reasoning that 
it was “well settled law that disclosure of a species is insufficient to provide de-
scriptive support for a generic or sub-generic claim”); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 
904, 910 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[T]here is no magical relation between the number of 
representative examples and the breadth of the claims; the number and variety 
of examples are irrelevant if the disclosure is ‘enabling’ and sets forth the ‘best 
mode contemplated.’”).  But cf. In re Grimme, 274 F.2d 949 (C.C.P.A. 1960).  The 
court in Grimme stated: 
The question as to the sufficiency of disclosure to support a generic or 
subgeneric claim in the field of chemistry has frequently been consid-
ered by this court and it has been consistently held that the naming of 
one member of such a group is not, in itself, a proper basis for a claim to 
the entire group.  However, it may not be necessary to enumerate a plu-
rality of species if a genus is sufficiently identified in an application by 
‘other appropriate language.’  What constitutes ‘other appropriate lan-
guage’ within the meaning of the cited cases will, of course, depend on 
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Nonetheless, the Hercules court correctly emphasized that 
the proper inquiry is whether there is a key feature common 
to those members of the claimed genus and associated with 
the utility alleged.302  Support for the presence of the feature, 
or its association with the alleged utility, might be derived 
from either the disclosure itself, or from the prior art gener-
ally.303  Thus, the inquiry is whether the applicant has relied 
upon a generic feature that is truly common to the invention, 
and whether that feature is recognized or shown to be asso-
ciated with the invention either within the prior art or the 
specification.304 
The applicant in In re Sichert305 failed to establish the req-
uisite nexus between the supposedly generic feature and the 
alleged inventive utility. Although the applicant described 
the therapeutic benefits of a drug obtained from plant ex-
tracts from various plant families,306 his disclosure failed to 
establish that the drug could be extracted successfully from 
even a single plant from each of the enumerated families.307 
The Sichert court’s reasoning seized upon the applicant’s  
reliance on general taxonomic principles to generalize the 
invention; the court noted that those principles have no ap-
parent relationship with the inventive utility, which, in this 
case, was the presence of the drug.308  Accordingly, the Si-
                                                                                                                                  
the circumstances of each particular case. 
Id. at 952 (citations omitted); M.P.E.P., supra note 16, § 2164.02 (“Working Exam-
ple”). 
302. Hercules, 497 F. Supp. at 682. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
306. Id. at 1156. 
307. Id.  The C.C.P.A. quoted the board’s reasoning with approval: 
We note that claim 1 recites families of plants as opposed to genuses.  
The taxonomy of plants is not based on drug content but on leaf form, 
flower type, etc.  Thus, the family Solanaceae, for example, includes bel-
ladonna, petunia, hot pepper and sweet pepper.  It is considered most 
unlikely that these varied plant types will yield the same drug extracts. 
Id. at 1161. 
308. Id. 
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chert court held that the applicants had failed to adequately 
support the generic invention, and thus affirmed the PTO’s 
rejection.309 
Similarly, in In re Vaeck,310 the Federal Circuit employed 
the same reasoning to affirm a section 112 rejection of broad 
genus claims.311  In Vaeck, the applicants claimed the use of 
specified genetic engineering techniques to produce insecti-
cidal proteins.312  Specifically, the applicants had shown how 
to make insecticidal Bacillus proteins with greater killing po-
tential under normal conditions of use, by transfecting a par-
ticular cyanobacterium to express the proteins.313  The appli-
cants interposed claims for a chimeric gene capable of being 
expressed in Cyanobacteria cells.314  The examiner rejected 
the claims, stating that:  (1) cyanobacteria comprise a large 
and diverse group of photosynthetic bacteria, including 
large numbers of species in some 150 different genera, and 
(2) that the claims were directed to subject matter having a 
high degree of unpredictability, due to the fact that such or-
ganisms had only recently come under serious study.315  The 
Vaeck court especially noted that the applicants had included 
only one example of a successfully transfected cyanobacte-
rium, and that only nine genera of cyanobacteria were men-
tioned in the specification.316  Because there was a great deal 
 
309. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161. 
310. 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
311. Id. at 495-96 
312. Id. at 489-90. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 490. 
315. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 492-93. 
316. The Vaeck court affirmed the section 112 rejection, saying: 
[T]here must be sufficient disclosure, either through illustrative exam-
ples or terminology, to teach those of ordinary skill how to make and 
how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed.  This means that 
the disclosure must adequately guide the art worker to determine with-
out undue experimentation, which species among all those encom-
passed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility.  Where as 
here a claimed genus represents a diverse and relatively poorly under-
stood group of microorganisms, the required level of disclosure will be 
    
212 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:147 
of uncertainty and unpredictability within the discipline, 
and because the applicants had provided such limited sup-
porting disclosure, the Vaeck court affirmed the PTO’s 
enablement rejection.317 
In In re Wright,318 the applicant disclosed processes for 
producing a live, non-pathogenic vaccine against a patho-
genic RNA virus.319  The specification possessed a single 
working example, describing a recombinant vaccine confer-
ring immunity in chickens against the RNA virus, Prague 
Avian Sarcoma Virus (“PrASV”).320  The applicant claimed:     
(1) processes for producing live non-pathogenic vaccines, (2) 
vaccines produced by those processes, and (3) methods of 
using claimed vaccines to protect living organisms against 
RNA viruses, generally, avian RNA viruses, and PrASV.321 
The PTO rejected Wright’s claims of broad and interme-
diate scope as non-enabled, given the breadth of the claims, 
the unpredictability in the relevant art, and the limited guid-
ance provided by the specification.322  The examiner noted 
that Wright’s broad and intermediate claims were directed 
to vaccines and methods useful against pathogenic RNA vi-
ruses, generally, which included AIDS, leukemia, and sar-
coma.323  The examiner reasoned that such broad claims 
were not enabled by the disclosure, and that undue experi-
mentation would be required to exploit the invention 
                                                                                                                                  
greater than, for example, the disclosure of an invention involving a 
“predictable” factor such as a mechanical or electrical element. 
Id. at 496. 
317. Id. at 495-96. 
318. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
319. Id. at 1559. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 1559-60. 
322. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560.  Wright’s disclosure contained only a single 
working example—that is, conferring immunity in chickens against Prague 
Avian Sarcoma Virus.  Id.  Following submission of in vivo data supporting the 
efficacy of that example, the corresponding claim was allowed.  Id.  Rejections 
were maintained for the broader claims encompassing non-pathogenic vaccines 
for avian RNA viruses and for all RNA viruses.  Id. 
323. Id. at 1560. 
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throughout its scope, particularly in view of the prevailing 
unpredictability within the relevant art.324 
In response, Wright argued—without supporting data— 
that the art was not as unpredictable as the examiner con-
cluded, and that undue experimentation would not have 
been required to exploit the invention with other RNA vi-
ruses.325  On appeal, the examiner stated that the art had not 
even then progressed to the stage the applicant urged as 
prevailing at the time of the invention, and specifically noted 
that the scientific community had yet to develop an effective 
AIDS vaccine.326  For support, the examiner cited for the first 
time an intervening reference teaching that AIDS retrovi-
ruses, a subset of all RNA viruses, possessed great genetic 
diversity.327  The examiner thus argued that the design and 
 
324. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560.  The examiner had previously reasoned thus: 
With respect to the claims broadly drawn to the claims of vaccines to 
any RNA tumor virus via recombinant techniques, it is noted that the 
specification does not generically teach the identification and cloning of 
all antigenic and pathogenic genes of all possible RNA tumor viruses, 
nor does the specification adequately provide means by which the anti-
genic genes can readily be isolated and cloned into a non-pathogenic vi-
rus absent an undue amount of further experimentation. 
It has not been shown e.g. that envelope genes are so similar in 
structure in different RNA tumor viruses such that the possession and 
cloning of the instant env gene would facilitate isolation and cloning of 
all others. . . . Note that the virus would have to be expressed on the 
surface of the virus so as to present the envelope protein to the host’s 
immune system, therefore the gene would have to recombine at a point 
that makes the envelope protein get externalized.  This is a further issue 
of unpredictability. 
U.S. Patent Application 06/914,620, Paper No. 3 (July 1, 1988) (This application is 
a continuation application of U.S. Patent Application 06/469,985 filed Feb. 25, 
1983). 
325. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562-63. 
326. U.S. Patent Application 06/914,620, Paper No. 27, (“Examiner’s An-
swer”).  The Examiner’s Answer is filed in the latter stages of the prosecution of 
a patent application.  37 C.F.R. § 1.191 (1996).  It is the examiner’s responsive ar-
guments to Appellant’s Brief on Appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and In-
terferences.  Id.  Appellant may make an Appeal and file such a Brief only after 
the claim(s) have been twice rejected or for which the rejection has been made 
final.  Id. 
327. Thomas J. Matthews et al., Prospects for Development of a Vaccine Against 
HIV, in HUMAN RETROVIRUSES, CANCER, AND AIDS:  APPROACHES TO PREVENTION & 
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production of recombinant virus vaccines against RNA tu-
mor viruses, generally, and against avian RNA viruses 
would have necessitated undue experimentation.328  The ex-
aminer’s reasoning was expressly adopted by the PTO Board 
of Appeals,329 and was later affirmed by the Federal Cir-
cuit.330  Thus, Wright is another illustration of an applicant’s 
failure to support generic claims with limited examples. 
3. The Burden of Proof Revisited 
Wright has been criticized as inconsistent with precedent, 
and as undermining the general objectives of the patent sys-
tem.331  The holding in Wright resulted, in substantial part, 
from a shift in the burden of proof, which in turn resulted 
                                                                                                                                  
THERAPY, 313-25 (1988).  Wright’s effective filing date was 1981. 
328. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560. 
329. Id. at 1561 n.5. 
330. Id. at 1564. 
331. See generally Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Bio-
technology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1994) (arguing that the court’s approval 
of the examiner’s reliance on the intervening (post filing date) reference was con-
trary to the rule of In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and that the holding 
unduly restricts the scope of enablement for biotechnology inventions); cf. 
Schuman, supra note 9, at 1699-1700.  Schuman argues that the C.C.P.A. espe-
cially scrutinizes enablement in the unpredictable arts, particularly those involv-
ing microbiological inventions, and thus unduly limits the scope of protection for 
inventions in those disciplines.  Id. 
Schuman proffers a continuum analogy to explain the court’s enablement 
holdings in the unpredictable arts as embodied in various holdings from In re 
Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970) and culminating in Ex parte Jackson, 217 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 804 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1982).  Id.  While the analogy may be 
appropriate, Jackson, like Wright and even Fisher itself, illustrates those cases 
wherein applicant relied upon a false inventive genus. 
In Jackson, applicants presented claims to a process for producing a specified 
antibiotic by culturing microorganisms of a specified genus.  217 U.S.P.Q. at 808.  
Three strains within the genus were exemplified.  Id.  As in In re Vaeck, the 
C.C.P.A. observed that biological classification was inexact and arbitrary.  See 
supra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing the Vaeck decision).  What the 
court failed to say, but implicit in its holding, was that the selection of morpho-
logical features upon which that classification is based are arbitrary or at the very 
least superficial.  That is, it would not have been expected by one of skill in the 
art that the features upon which the microorganisms were taxonomically classi-
fied were necessarily consistent with the production of an antibiotic.  Thus, reli-
ance on the taxonomic genus was unrelated to the inventive feature, and the 
claims failed due to reliance on a false inventive genus. 
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the PTO’s assessment that the discipline was unpredictable.  
In re Wright is significant in that it further refined the rela-
tionship between unpredictability and the burden of proof in 
supporting or rejecting generic claims. 
The burden is on the PTO to make a prima facie case that 
the scope of a generic claim is not commensurate with the 
scope of enablement provided by the disclosure.  This is es-
pecially so where the PTO takes exception to the applicant’s 
explicit representations supporting the breadth of the 
claims.332  That is, the PTO must affirmatively rebut the ap-
plicant’s implicit assertion that one of ordinary skill in the 
relevant art would appreciate the practicability of the inven-
tion, or would be able to confirm it without inventive ex-
perimentation.333 
The PTO often seeks to meet this burden by arguing that 
the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the invention and 
 
332. See, e.g., In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 862 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Marzocchi, 
439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Ex parte Gastambide, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643, 
645 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1974). 
333. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561-62.  As the Wright court explained: 
When rejecting a claim under the enablement requirement of section 
112, the PTO bears an initial burden of setting forth a reasonable expla-
nation as to why it believes that the scope of protection provided by 
that claim is not adequately enabled by the description of the invention 
provided in the specification of the application; this includes, of course, 
providing sufficient reasons for doubting any assertions in the specifica-
tion as to the scope of enablement.  If the PTO meets this burden, the 
burden then shifts to the applicant to provide suitable proofs indicating 
that the specification is indeed enabling. 
Id.; see also Ex parte Gastambide, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 
1974) (holding proper grounds for rejection require more than unsubstantiated 
doubt as to the operability of the invention); cf. In re Robins, 429 F.2d 452, 457 
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (concluding that section 112 does not require that the specifica-
tion convince persons skilled in the art that assertions therein are correct).  But cf. 
Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1705 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992) 
(“When a patent applicant chooses to forego exemplification and bases utility on 
broad terminology and general allegations, he runs the risk that unless one with 
ordinary skill in the art would accept the allegations as obviously valid and cor-
rect, the examiner may, properly, ask for evidence to substantiate them.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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the genus are coextensive.334  Support for that argument can 
be drawn from teachings in the prior art, as in In re Fouche,335 
or, as we learn from Wright, from a general assessment that 
the relevant art is unpredictable.336 
Just as the sufficiency of an applicant’s disclosure must 
be measured as of its filing date,337 so too must support for 
the PTO’s rejection rely upon the prevailing state of the art 
as of the filing date.338  In In re Hogan,339 the court struck 
down a rejection based upon a later development in the 
relevant art.340  In Hogan, the applicants disclosed and 
claimed solid polymers made from certain olefinic mono-
mers.341  Subsequent to the applicants’ priority date, a publi-
cation appeared disclosing that certain polymers within the 
claimed genus could be synthesized in an amorphous, rather 
than crystalline, form.342  The examiner rejected the genus 
claim as not enabled, noting that while the applicants’ dis-
closed embodiments were crystalline, the patent claims were 
not so limited.343  The revelation of a crystalline/amorphous 
dichotomy, the examiner reasoned, rendered the claims am-
biguous, and therefore unduly broad and non-enabled.344 
The appellate court held that there was no basis on the 
record to question the sufficiency of the applicants’ disclo-
sure as of their filing date, absent the later publication; that 
is, as of the filing date, there was no reason to suspect the 
 
334. See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 
1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
335. See supra notes 228-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Fouche 
decision). 
336. See generally In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
337. See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
338. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
339. 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
340. Id. 
341. Id. at 597-98. 
342. Id. at 599-600. 
343. Id. at 600. 
344. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 600. 
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polymers would be other than crystalline.345  Thus, the ex-
aminer improperly relied upon the later publication to chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the disclosure.346 
In Wright, the applicant disclosed methods for making 
vaccines against RNA viruses, vaccines produced thereby, 
and methods for protecting living organisms against RNA 
viruses.347  While providing only a single example, the appli-
cant interposed claims directed to the exemplified virus, 
PrASV, as well as all avian RNA viruses, and RNA viruses, 
generally.348  The examiner rejected the claims of the latter 
two categories for lack of enablement, and, on appeal to the 
PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, cited an in-
tervening reference.349 The PTO Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection, and, on fur-
ther appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
the Wright court affirmed the PTO’s rejections of the claims 
in the latter two categories for lack of enablement.350 
One commentator has argued that, at the very least, 
Wright’s claims of intermediate scope, directed to vaccines 
against avian RNA viruses, should have been allowed, and 
that the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the intervening article 
contravened Hogan.351 
 In re Wright does not contravene Hogan.  Rather, it 
stands for the proposition that the PTO need not rely on an 
explicit teaching or admission to assess unpredictability, and 
that assessment alone might be sufficient to shift the burden 
of proof.  Wright thus charts a middle path between the prin-
ciples espoused in Hogan and those of In re Fouche. 
In Hogan, the court refused to allow the PTO to use an in-
 
345. Id. at 605. 
346. Id. 
347. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1559-60. 
348. Id. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. at 1564. 
351. Canady, supra note 331, at 258-62. 
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tervening reference to find unpredictability in the first in-
stance.352  The first indication that the applicants had not en-
abled the creation of olefinic polymers as broadly as had 
been claimed came from the reference published after the 
applicants’ priority date.353  Thus, the post-priority reference 
was essential to the examiner’s prima facie case.354 
In Wright, the court specifically held that the PTO had 
met its burden by setting forth a reasonable basis for doubt-
ing the applicant’s broad, unsupported statements, and thus 
the sufficiency of the disclosure.355  That reasoning created a 
prima facie case, and shifted the burden to Wright to prove 
otherwise.356  The examiner’s reliance on the intervening ar-
ticle, according to the court, merely countered the appli-
cant’s rebuttal by demonstrating that the relevant art was 
not even then as predictable as the applicant suggested it 
was at the time the application was filed.357  The Wright 
court thus concluded that the intervening article was not 
needed to make a prima facie case of non-enablement.358  The 
applicants failure to respond with “persuasive arguments, 
supported by suitable proofs where necessary, that the ap-
pealed claims were truly enabled” resulted in the demise of 
the broader claims.359 
 
352. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605-06. 
353. Id. at 605 & n.17. 
354. Id. 
355. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562; see also id. at 1564 (addressing specifically the 
more narrow claims directed to avian RNA viruses); cf. Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1705 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991) (noting that in the ab-
sence of examples or support for the proposition that one of skill would accept 
representations as obviously valid and correct, the PTO might properly ask for 
evidence to substantiate them). 
356. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562. 
357. Id. at 1562-63. 
358. Id.  In Wright, the court held that the PTO’s assessment of unpredict-
ability merely shifted the burden to Wright to provide evidence supporting the 
propriety of his inventive genus.  Id.  This he failed to do.  Notwithstanding, one 
can’t help but wonder whether the result in Wright would have been different 
had the art turned out to be as predictable as Wright alleged in his disclosure.  
See id. at 1562. 
359. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562. 
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III. ADOPTION OF A NEW APPROACH—THE FALSE INVENTIVE 
GENUS—WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE CONSISTENT 
APPLICATION OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE INQUIRY 
When working within disciplines perceived to be unpre-
dictable, the applicant is at risk of assuming the burden of 
proof that a generic claim is, in fact, supported by his or her 
disclosure.360  That risk is increased when the PTO or the 
courts conclude that the applicant or the patentee has relied 
on a false inventive genus.  This part introduces the notion 
of the false inventive genus, and examines its role in the suf-
ficiency of the disclosure analysis among the unpredictable 
arts. 
A. The False Inventive Genus Defined 
With the demise of rejections based upon undue 
breadth361 and inoperative embodiments,362 and the ascent of 
the undue experimentation inquiry,363 there remains a nag-
ging ambiguity.  Rejections alleging the need for undue ex-
perimentation, or that the scope of enablement is not com-
mensurate in scope with the claims, beg the question.364  
Standing alone, they offer the applicant little more than a 
bald rebuke that he or she either did not disclose enough, or 
seeks to claim too much. 
 
360. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing generally the 
burden of proof generally in the context of the unpredictable arts); supra notes 
187-236 and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof in the context of 
“inoperative embodiments”); supra notes 331-58 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the burden of proof in the context of “undue experimentation”). 
361. See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text (discussing rejections 
based on “undue breadth”). 
362. See supra 117-236 and accompanying text (discussing rejections based 
on “inoperative embodiments”). 
363. See supra 237-359 and accompanying text (discussing rejections based 
on “undue experimentation”). 
364. See Todaro, supra, note 7, at 39 (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s 
course away from reliance on the Forman factors for determining undue experi-
mentation will erode predictability in the law and leave applicants guessing as to 
what constitutes undue experimentation). 
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In some instances, the implicit supporting argument is 
that the applicant has indulged in an impermissible gener-
alization or has created a false inventive genus; that is, the 
feature or principle upon which the applicant relies to gen-
eralize the invention beyond the empirical results presented 
is collateral to the invention.  Although not expressed as 
such, the objection has arisen persistently within the unpre-
dictable arts.365 
By identifying the creation of a false inventive genus, the 
PTO and the courts will more readily isolate the unsup-
ported inference or extrapolation giving rise to the alleged 
insufficiency in the disclosure.  In so doing, reviewing au-
thorities will more reliably focus on the issues requiring 
resolution, address those issues, and thereby bring greater 
consistency and predictability to this area of the law. 
The issues derived from reliance on a false inventive ge-
nus have arisen periodically in various contexts since at least 
the advent of the undue experimentation inquiry.366  More-
over, some of the decisions discussed above address rejec-
tions founded upon an applicant’s creation and reliance on a 
false inventive genus. 
For example, in In re Sichert, the applicants included 
wide-ranging families of plants as source material for a 
drug.367  The court concluded that the applicants had gener-
alized the invention based upon taxonomic criteria not nec-
essarily related to drug content.368  The court affirmed the 
 
365. See, e.g., In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Vaeck, 947 
F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557; see also supra notes 237-359 
and accompanying text (discussing these decisions). 
366. See, e.g., PTO DRUG UTILITY GUIDELINES, supra note 124; see also In re 
Wright, 999 F.2d 1557; In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488; In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154; see 
also supra notes 237-359 and accompanying text (discussing the undue experi-
mentation inquiry). 
367. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1156; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Sichert decision). 
368. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1162-63; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Sichert decision). 
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PTO Board of Appeals’ conclusion that it was “most un-
likely” that plant extracts from the various plant families in 
Sichert’s generic claim possessed the desired drug.369  Thus, 
Sichert had created a false inventive genus, and the court af-
firmed the PTO’s enablement rejection of the generic 
claim.370 
Similarly, the applicant in In re Vaeck relied on a false in-
ventive genus.  In Vaeck, the applicant claimed techniques 
for genetically manipulating cyanobacteria, generally, to 
produce insecticidal Bacillus proteins.371  As in Sichert, the 
applicant in Vaeck sought to define the scope of his exclusive 
right by relying upon traditional taxonomic classification.372  
In rejecting the applicant’s claim, the Vaeck court concluded 
that the principles upon which this taxonomic system is 
based are not necessarily coincident with suitability for the 
disclosed genetic manipulation.373  That is, the applicant had 
not shown that there was a nexus between the taxonomic ba-
sis upon which cyanobacteria is classified, and the ability of 
the cyanobacteria to incorporate foreign DNA molecules to 
express the requisite insecticidal protein.374  Thus, the court 
held that one of skill in the relevant art would not conclude, 
based upon mere commonality of gross morphological fea-
tures, that these varied microorganisms could be trans-
 
369. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Sichert decision). 
370. Sichert, 566 F.2d at 1161; see also supra note 305-08 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Sichert decision). 
371. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 489-90; see also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the 
Vaeck decision). 
372. Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 489-90; see also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the 
Vaeck decision). 
373. See Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496 (“[T]he disclosure must adequately guide the 
art worker to determine, without undue experimentation, which species among 
all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility.”); see 
also supra notes 310-16(discussing the Vaeck decision). 
374. See Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496 (“[T]he disclosure must adequately guide the 
art worker to determine, without undue experimentation, which species among 
all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility.”); see 
also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the Vaeck decision). 
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formed with the same chimeric gene to express insecticidal 
Bacillus proteins.375   
Similarly, the Wright court’s reasoning suggests that the 
applicant’s disclosure failed to establish an acknowledged 
and relevant relationship between the sole exemplified re-
combinant PrASV, and avian retroviruses and retroviruses, 
generally.376  Wright failed to persuade the PTO and the 
court that one of skill in the relevant art would accept as ob-
viously valid and correct that all avian retroviruses possess 
the feature he had genetically manipulated in PrASV, or 
were susceptible to such manipulation, to create a recombi-
nant virus capable of effecting an immunoprotective, rather 
than pathogenic, response.377  Seemingly, Wright had arbi-
trarily chosen to genericize the invention based upon mor-
phological features of a host, rather than demonstrably re-
current genetic features of the virus, per se.378  This reliance 
on an ad hoc genus, coupled with a lack of supporting evi-
dence, precipitated the downfall of the claims.379 
Some cases involved in the inoperative embodiments im-
broglio fit the same model.  A few examples from the discus-
sion above are illustrative.380  In Fisher, for example, the 
court found fatal flaws in claims directed to an adrenocorti-
cotrophic hormone (“ACTH”) preparation.381  The appli-
 
375. See Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496 (“[T]he disclosure must adequately guide the 
art worker to determine, without undue experimentation, which species among 
all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility.”); see 
also supra notes 310-16 (discussing the Vaeck decision). 
376. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Wright decision). 
377. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1562; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Wright decision). 
378. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1564; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Wright decision). 
379. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1564; see also supra notes 318-29 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Wright decision). 
380. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing rejections 
based on inoperative embodiments generally). 
381. 427 F.2d at 836; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Fisher decision). 
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cant’s specification disclosed the ACTH amino acid se-
quences for hog, sheep, and beef:  all were thirty-nine amino 
acids in length, the first twenty-four of which were identi-
cal.382  The applicant claimed ACTHs having at least these 
common twenty-four amino acids in sequence, thus relying 
on the common sequence to genericize the invention.383  
Nonetheless, the applicant failed to show availability or ac-
tivity of ACTHs of anything other than thirty-nine amino ac-
ids, much less those of only twenty-four amino acids.384  Al-
though the applicant identified a generic feature among his 
enabled embodiments (i.e., a particular twenty-four amino 
acid sequence), he improperly relied upon that feature to 
genericize the invention because it lacked a nexus with the 
activity relied upon for utility.385  Accordingly, the Fischer 
court affirmed the rejection of the broad claims.386 
Similarly, in In re Barr,387 the issue on appeal involved 
claims to certain photographic “coupler” compounds, and, in 
particular, the applicants’ generic terminology in claiming 
those compounds.388  The examiner objected to the use of the 
terms, “5-pyrazolone coupler radical” and “open-chain ke-
tomethylene coupler radical,” because only a few of such 
radicals were exemplified in the specification.389  The Barr 
court faulted the examiner and the PTO Board of Appeals, 
 
382. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 836; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Fisher decision). 
383. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 835; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Fisher decision). 
384. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 836; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Fisher decision). 
385. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 838-39; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Fisher decision). 
386. Fisher, 427 F.2d at 840; see also supra notes 265-67 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Fisher decision). 
387. 444 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Barr decision). 
388. Barr, 444 F.2d at 595; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Barr decision). 
389. Barr, 444 F.2d at 595; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Barr decision). 
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noting that the appellants had contemplated the utility of the 
genus within their specification, but that neither the exam-
iner nor the board had explained why that genus was sus-
pect.390  The PTO had failed to present reasoning or evidence 
questioning the appellants’ use of terminology by which 
they defined their invention.391  Absent such reasoning or 
evidence, the PTO was obligated to accept it.392  Thus, the 
examiner’s implicit argument—that these terms represented 
a false inventive genus—failed. 
Finally, in Marzocchi, the examiner had objected to the 
appellants’ use of the generic term “polyethyleneamine” in 
defining a class of adhesion enhancers in their invention.393  
The appellants had used the term consistently within the 
disclosure to describe the invention, and in the claims to de-
fine the scope of the invention.394  Because the PTO failed to 
explain why it doubted the truth or accuracy of the appel-
lants’ supporting statements, it was obligated to accept them 
as true.395  Again, what was effectively a false inventive ge-
nus argument failed. 
B. Routine Experimentation or False Inventive Genus 
An applicant is not obligated to provide examples of all 
conceivable embodiments of the claimed invention.396  
Nonetheless, while a specification need not be a blueprint,397 
an applicant is not entitled to usurp broad areas of technol-
 
390. Barr, 444 F.2d at 596; see also In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693 (C.C.P.A. 
1979); In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
391. Barr, 444 F.2d at 596; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Barr decision). 
392. Barr, 444 F.2d at 596; see also supra notes 193, 227, 240 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Barr decision). 
393. 439 F.2d at 221-22; see also supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text. 
394. 439 F.2d at 223; see also supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text. 
395. 439 F.2d at 223; see also supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text. 
396. See supra notes 204-05, 208-09 and accompanying text. 
397. See generally Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 181 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (W.D. Pa. 1974). 
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ogy by making broad, unsupported statements.398 
The sufficiency of disclosure challenges most commonly 
arise where the applicant expressly contemplates broad ap-
plicability of the innovation based upon a discovery that 
purportedly brings predictability to a discipline,399 but 
where the applicant arguably has not supported that new-
found predictability with sufficient reliable scientific 
proof.400  In such cases, the applicant has complied with the 
written description requirement,401 and perhaps has made a 
prima facie case for enablement.402  Nonetheless, if the PTO 
can show that the field of endeavor is notoriously unpredict-
able, the absence of examples or data that thoroughly corre-
spond to the scope of the claim might operate to shift the 
burden back to applicant to further prove enablement.403 
The challenge often arises from one of two perspec-
tives—either the applicant:  (1) has failed to provide a disclo-
sure that enables one of skill in the art to practice the inven-
tion throughout its scope, or (2) has failed to provide a 
disclosure that would lead one of skill in the art to conclude 
that the utility of the claimed invention resides throughout 
the claimed genus.404  Although the subtleties of the two per-
 
398. See In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357, 361 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“The mere state-
ment of an inventive concept, however, is not a sufficient basis for claiming it.  
Sufficient information must be given to enable those skilled in the art to practice 
the invention.”); see also supra note 301 (discussing the Cavallito decision); supra 
notes 38-40, 54, 68 and accompanying text (explaining that full disclosure of in-
ventors’ claims protects the public against ad hoc extension of exclusive rights). 
399. See supra notes 68-73 (discussing disclosure in the unpredictable arts). 
400. See supra notes 68-73 (discussing disclosure in the unpredictable arts). 
401. See supra notes 44-46 (explaining the statutory requirement of a written 
description); notes 132-47 (written description in the context of the unpredictable 
arts). 
402. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing enablement 
generally); notes 150-76 and accompanying text (discussing enablement in the 
unpredictable arts). 
403. See supra notes 187-236 and accompanying text (discussing the burden 
of proof in the context of “inoperative embodiments” rejections); notes 331-58 
and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof in the context of “undue 
experimentation” inquiry). 
404. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text 
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spectives might differ, the essential inquiry is the same:  
whether the applicant provided a disclosure sufficiently 
thorough that one of skill in the relevant art would expect 
that he or she would be enabled to successfully exploit the 
invention throughout the claimed scope.  If the applicant has 
arbitrarily chosen features assumed to be generic to the in-
vention, one might conclude that one of skill in the art 
would not expect to be able to successfully exploit the inven-
tion throughout that genus. 
The decision to grant or uphold broad generic claims in 
any art involves a series of subtle, qualitative inquiries in 
view of the prior art as a whole.  For example, the PTO can 
be expected to consider, from the perspective of one of ordi-
nary skill in the relevant art, whether working embodiments 
of the invention would be expected to reside throughout the 
claimed range.405  Moreover, the issue might arise as to 
whether further experimentation would be required so as to 
exploit the invention in its entirety; if so, would one expect it 
to be merely routine (albeit perhaps lengthy) experimenta-
tion—which will not defeat the claim406—or would one ex-
 
405. See supra notes 117-236 and accompanying text (discussing rejections 
based on “inoperative embodiments”). 
406. See supra notes 237-359 (discussing rejections based on “undue experi-
mentation”); see, e.g., Minerals Separation v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916); In re 
Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498; In re Marzoc-
chi, 439 F.2d 220; In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730; International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor 
Co. 166 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Ex parte Mark, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904 
(Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).  In International Nickel Co., the court, quoting Judge 
Learned Hand, reiterated: 
It is as if a chemist were directed to add enough of an element to secure 
precipitation.  Such a recipe would be an absolutely accurate guide to 
the result though the quantity varied with the temperature or atmos-
pheric humidity.  What men need is a path to the goal; they will not be 
curious of the country it traverses. 
166 F. Supp. at 558 (quoting Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co., 
232 F. 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1916)).  Similarly, in Mark, the court explained: 
The fact that a given protein may not be amenable for use in the present 
invention in that the cysteine residues are needed for the biological ac-
tivity of the protein does not militate against a conclusion of enable-
ment.  One skilled in the art is clearly enabled to perform such work as 
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pect it to require ingenuity beyond that attributable to one of 
ordinary skill in the art—which might defeat the claim.407  
Occasionally, these determinations, and the larger question 
of allowability (or validity), will depend upon whether the 
invention is properly denominated “unpredictable.”  As has 
been stated so many times, however, there can be no general 
rule, and the scope of protection properly afforded depends 
upon the facts of each individual case. 
CONCLUSION 
Inventions within the unpredictable arts present unique 
challenges in meeting the Patent Act’s disclosure require-
ments.  Applications claiming an invention possessed of un-
predictable factors will be carefully scrutinized for compli-
ance with the utility, written description, how-to-make-and-
use, and enablement requirements.  Even if the applicant’s 
disclosure facially complies with those requirements, courts 
or the PTO might still challenge the applicant for evidence to 
support enablement. 
The PTO bears the burden of supporting that challenge 
with acceptable evidence or reasoning why it doubts the 
truth or accuracy of supporting statements within the disclo-
sure.  When the invention is claimed more broadly than that 
which is exemplified within the application, unpredictability 
alone might satisfy that burden.  If so, the burden shifts to 
the applicant to prove enablement throughout the scope of 
                                                                                                                                  
needed to determine whether the cysteine residues of a given protein 
are needed for retention of biological activity. 
12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1907. 
407. See supra notes 237-359 (discussing rejections based on “undue experi-
mentation”); see, e.g., Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 
U.S. 465, 16 S. Ct. 75 (1895); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re 
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Panzl v. Battle Island Paper Co., 138 F. 48 
(2d Cir. 1905); In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Schmidt, 153 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 640 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Grant, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 248 
(C.C.P.A. 1962); In re Cavallito, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202 (C.C.P.A. 1960); Ex parte 
Singh, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990); Ex parte Sizto, 9 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2081 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988). 
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the claim; to meet that burden, the applicant should be enti-
tled to draw upon evidence that is extrinsic to the applica-
tion itself. 
When generically claiming an invention likely to be de-
nominated unpredictable, applicants should strive to estab-
lish an explicit logical link, through carefully constructed 
evidence or reasoning, connecting the demonstrated oper-
ability of the invention with the basis upon which the genus 
has been selected.  Failure to do so leaves an applicant open 
to a sufficiency of disclosure rejection, due to apparent reli-
ance on a false inventive genus.  By expressly identifying in-
stances of improper reliance on a false inventive genus, the 
PTO will focus more effectively on the perceived shortcom-
ing, thereby narrowing any outstanding issues and enhanc-
ing the prospects for proper and well-reasoned resolution of 
those issues. 
 
